StrategyUnit

Summary: The Global Swarm Continues
StrategyUnit has focused on the fact that “Islamic Terrorism” (for lack of a better, shorter term) as it exists today is very much the global guerilla movement that John Robb has been writting about.

The recent arrests in Toronto, aborting a potential attacking, and a recent article by Michael Scheuer (author of Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War), reinforce the position that Islamic Terrorism is an organic, decentralized beast. Its bigger than Al-Qaida, bigger than Bin Laden and bigger than the now deceased al-Zarqawi. Al-Qaida does have an important role, but as the instigator, the proclaimed vanguard, of a wider Islamist social movement.

Indeed, as StrategyUnit has noted: “As this war is more of cross between an insurgency and a social movement, there maybe no clean cessation of violence in the near or distant future. And in this conflict, there will be no battlefields, but rather our adversaries will be attached as a Global Swarm as Global Guerillas.”

The Toronto 17
The 17 potential terrorists arrested in Tortonto has direct connections to Al-Qaida and were, like the July 7 Londong bombers, homegrown groups. While the details are coming out, the Internet played a major role in communication, indoctrination (recruitment) and training (bombing making).

The suspected terrorists were, luckily for us, inept. A group of “foreign looking” men doing weapons training in the open and later buying three tons of fertilizers (not a fact easy to hide) are not the hallmarks of terrorist masterminds.

Bin Laden - Status: Success or Failure

Michael Scheuer, author of Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War, notes that many experts have written off Bin Laden as a failure:

Over the past two years, U.S. and Western commentators have concluded that Osama bin Laden is largely irrelevant as the leader of the worldwide Sunni insurgency. Newsweek’s Fareed Zakaria, for example, has said that “by now it is surely clear that al-Qaeda can produce videotapes but not terrorism…And the bad guys are losing” (Newsweek, March 15, 2004). James S. Dobbins at the National Review added that bin Laden “made many threats of course, but was never able to back them up, creating an unbridgeable credibility gap” (National Review Online, September 28, 2005). The new CIA chief, General Michael Hayden, has described bin Laden’s recent audiotapes as a public relations campaign to prove he is still alive. “These attempts,” Hayden said, “may be an attempt on their part [bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri] to kind of re-establish authenticity with their followers” (AP, February 5). Finally, from Sarah Lawrence College, Fawaz Gerges all but dismisses bin Laden’s relevance, arguing that “we are in the throes of the beginning of a new wave [in the Muslim world]–the freedom generation–in which civil society is asserting itself” (Christian Science Monitor, February 4, 2004). In short, these arguments assert that the situation has improved.

But indeed, this is not the case. Scheuer correctly points out that Bin Laden, sees himself and Al-Qaida as the final means, but the “match” to light the Ummah (Islamic World) on fire, motivating it against the West:

“[Bin Laden] has never claimed that al-Qaeda could achieve this goal by itself. Quite the contrary, he has consistently maintained that al-Qaeda is only the vanguard of the large-scale movement that is needed to achieve this goal.”

The recruitment of Europeans to fight in Iraq, the Madrid and London Bombings, the abortive attempt in Toronto, the recent alliance of “”Islamist leaders in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, Jordan and Jerusalem” all point to the face that the “flame” is alive and thriving.

Conclusion
The recent Toronto arrests shows that the threat is still very real and is far more diverse than a threat “from over there”, but it is a threat that can be as homegrown as meatloaf and apple pie (for you American readers).

The Observer reports leaks regarding the July 7 London subway bombing inquiry by the British Government:

The official inquiry into the 7 July London bombings will say the attack was planned on a shoestring budget from information on the internet, that there was no ‘fifth-bomber’ and no direct support from al-Qaeda, although two of the bombers had visited Pakistan.

While this is not surprising news in itself (if indeed, these leaks are accurate), this confirms the difficulty and the nature of the threat in this (for a lack of a better name) the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The enemy we face is larger, bigger than Al-Qaida or Bin Laden - it is a worldview, an idea - something that cannot be easily stopped.

According to the report, the attacks were largely motivated by concerns over foreign policy and the perception that it was deliberately anti-Muslim, although the four men were also driven by the promise of immortality.

As mentioned in earlier post, “Global Swarm: Explaining GWOT through Thomas Barnett, Huntington, Global Guerillas “, the threat we face is a cocktail mix of religion and issues of social justice (mix of real/exaggerated/false etc) with an overall feeling of the persecution of Muslims (The Ummah) around the world. Defeating such a “movement” will indeed be a Long War.

Quick Post - Francis Fukayama on Europe’s Identity Crisis and Islam
Europe, Muslims, Demographics and Eurabia

On Slate Magazine today, Francis Fukayama’s “Europe vs. Radical Islam” takes to tasks the rash of “decline of Europe, raise of Eurabia” books that have been hitting American shelves lately, specifically “The West’s Last Chance” by Tony Blankley and “While Europe Slept” by Bruce Bawer. However, Fukayama focuses on the most extreme and perhaps even founder of the “decline of the West” crowd: Pat Buchanan’s “Decline of the West”.

Oddly and disappointingly, Fukayama skips over Bat Ye’or “Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis “, though he mentions the word. Its a shame because Eurabia is probably the most credible of all four books that addresses the subject with the fullest sense of reason and moderation with no wild scenerios like the type Blankey represents. Why this major omission?

Regardless, I believe Fukayama goes to the heart of the issue of Muslims in Europe and shifts the question on the need for Europeans to redefine what it means to be British, French, Germany…what it means to be European:

The problem that most Europeans face today is that they don’t have a vision of the kinds of positive cultural values their societies stand for and should promote, other than endless tolerance and moral relativism. What each European society needs is to invent an open form of national identity similar to the American creed, an identity that is accessible to newcomers regardless of ethnicity or religion. This was the idea behind Bassam Tibi’s concept of Leitkultur (guiding or reference culture), the notion that the European Enlightenment gave rise to a distinct and positive universalist culture based on the dignity of the individual. Muslims coming to Europe would be minimally expected to accept this perspective as their own. The German Christian Democrats timidly endorsed a version of this five years ago, only to retreat in the face of charges of racism and anti-immigrant prejudice from the left. Interest in a “demokratische Leitkultur” has been revived in the wake of recent events, however, and a vigorous debate has opened up over how to define it. There will be many missteps along the way: The state of Baden-Württemberg, for example, recently introduced a test that would require the respondent to support gay marriage as a condition for citizenship, something deliberately designed to exclude Muslims.

Time is getting short to address these questions. Europeans should have started a discussion about how to integrate their Muslim minorities a generation ago, before the winds of radical Islamism had started to blow. The cartoon controversy, while beginning with a commendable European desire to assert basic liberal values, may constitute a Rubicon that will be very hard to re-cross. We should be alarmed at the scope of the problem, but prudent in responding to it, since escalating cultural conflict throughout the Continent will bring us closer to a showdown between Islamists and secularists that will increasingly look like a clash of civilizations.

Fukayama nails on the head that Europe needs to find out what being European means before they began a process of incorporating other groups into their societies. The threat of a “Clash of Civlizations” in Europe is very real but fortunately has not fully materialized yet. Time is running short, but that doesnt mean its too late.

Spook86’s “In From the Cold” is a blog folks need to check out. Spook86 mentions some possible motives behind Bush Administration’s support for the UAE port deal:

From Port Call:

Cancelling the port deal could mean the end of U.S. basing rights in the UAE, strained relations with other regional partners, and the potential loss of a key defense contract, all viewed as critical in fighting the War on Terror. Collectively, those factors probably explain why the deal hasn’t already been nixed, and why the Bush Administration may put up a fight–even with political allies.
…
Cancellation of the contract would be viewed as an insult to the UAE and its leadership; regional critics would accuse the U.S. of hypocrisy–anxious to utilize UAE bases and sell its defense hardware to the Dubai, but unwilling to let a UAE company manage operations in U.S. ports. Such criticism, in turn, would cause other Gulf allies to question Washington’s long-term committment to the region, and make it more difficult for the U.S. to sustain basing rights in such countries as Qatar and Bahrain.

In the domestic area, the Bush Administration is in a tightspot as it defends the deal, while the Democrats are taking advantage of the UAE deal to look strong in homeland security. However, as Spook86 mentions, the deal has wide geopolitical implications. There’s a lot at stake for the US, the Middle East and the War on Terror (GWOT). Congress has a right to be concerned, but these concerns must be placed in greater political and international context.

For more on US Military Bases in UAE check out GlobalSecurity.org

Down at the Winds of Change.net, the Armed Liberal and Trent Telenko have been discussing what to do with the Iranian situation. I have made my own comments at WoC, but I am repeating them here because I think laying out the choices in this manner really helps in providing constructive discussion on the Iranian Question.

Weighing the Concequences: Doing some Bombing v. Just Doing Nothing
Note that the “Doing Some Bombing” concequences are mostly short-term issues, while “Just Doing Nothing” are long term issues.

(more…)

Quick Post on the Iran and Iraq

In the Wretchard’s “The Coming of the Bomb” at Belmont Club, he excerpts from the US Army War College’s “Getting Ready For A Nuclear-Ready Iran” monograph:

“[An] ever more nuclear-ready Iran will try to lead the revolutionary Islamic vanguard throughout the Islamic world by becoming the main support for terrorist organizations aimed against Washington’s key regional ally, Israel; America’s key energy source, Saudi Arabia; and Washington’s prospective democratic ally, Iraq.”

The Wretchard extends this analysis to declare, “It could mark the final end of efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and provide Islamic terrorism with a nuclear deterrent.”

If the prediction above holds true than the Iraqi project will fail before it even has a chance to really succeed. The great hope for the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was to help galvanize democracy and openness in the Middle East with the chance to be a Shia counterweight to the mullahs in Iran and bring hope to the Iranian people by showing them an alternative route.

An emboldened nuclear Iran that would be able to leverage its nuclear power status to aggressively support Islamic terrorist organizations and would contribute to even more instability to the security environment in the Middle East and many Muslim nations.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad intentions for the nuclear weapons are still not quite clear. His extreme rhetoric has caused much alarm and, indeed, the cause of the escalation of the crisis. Here are just some possible motives:
1) Deterrent against the US. The US surrounds Iran on three sides: Iraq in the west, Afghanistan in the south, and in the Persian Gulf where the US superior naval forces can be sent.
2) To generate a crisis that will consolidate Ahmadinejad’s political base? This would be in line with his stark political rhetoric, which has captured the political discourse.
3) Leverage to propel Iranian Republic as the revolutionary vanguard of Islam (despite the Shi’a vs. Sunni differences)?

I don’t think we have enough information on this to move beyond such speculation and until the only logical route with Iran is through engagement, exchanging the world’s acquiesce of Iran’s nuclear development for some sort of economic openness (a way to tie and restrain Tehran’s action). Short of a risky military action or regime change, we sadly have no options left.

PS: As a side note Officer’s Club (via DefenseTech) points to a Washington Post’s article on a “bolt-out-of-the-blue” plan for rapid global strike, a supposed plan called CONPLAN 8022 that deals specifically with Iran and North Korea. Unless the world stands behind the US (with the pen and the sword), such a plan would be very unlikely.

Introduction
I wrote a paper some years ago that I’d like to bring out to StrategyUnit, since I feel there is still a lot of room to discuss the (mislabeled) Global War on Terror (GWOT). Indeed, I believe that there is a supreme lacking in the mature development of a conceptual framework to understand the Global Islamist Insurgency (GII). Theoretical and conceptual frameworks are needed; it functions as a systematic “outline”, on which we can organize a strategy and devise proper policy. What follows before is shortened version of the original 20+ page paper.

The Premise
In the formulation of my own conceptual framework for understanding GWOT, I submit the following general premises:
1. The need to look beyond the traditional levels of analysis of international relations - personal, state and system level – and to take account local and transnational social cleavages.
2. Instability today is principally caused by the lack of “global connectivity” in certain counties and societies, resulting in local and regional crises and conflicts.
3. Variants of Salafi-Jihadi/Pan-Islamism have conflated these crises and conflicts as a global conflict against Islam and the Ummah by the “Other.”

Of course, there will alway be outlier cases, but the premises serves to cover the vast majority of situations relating to GWOT.

Thomas Barnett v. Samuel Huntington

There is no current theory or framework that can easily match with these premises. However, we can build this framework by synthesizing Barnett and Huntington. Below is a mini-review of their concepts and some of their shortfalls when taken alone.

Thomas Barnett declares that the amount of global “connectivity” in the world defines security issues in the international environment. It is the amount of connectivity a state possesses – in the transnational flow of trade, media, finances, information, culture et cetera – that distinguish between a peaceful, integrated “Core” state and a hostile or unstable “Gap” state. As Barnett states, the “new world must be defined by where globalization has truly taken root [the Core] and where it has not [the Gap].”(1) In short, the level of strategic regional and global security is directly linked to the level of globalization. This is no difference.

While Thomas Barnett presents a long term “big picture” framework for understanding the source of instability in the world, it cannot alone fully describe the nature of GWOT. It does not explain why certain peoples in certain regions are engaging in a confrontation against the members of the Core. In other words, if the international security environment is defined by those in the Gap and those in the Core, why were the majority of the 9/11 hijackers from Saudi Arabia, and not shamans from Indonesia or Orthodox Christians from Belarus?

The essential variables that need to be added to Barnett’s framework are those of religious and ultimately of socio-cultural factors.

While Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilization” goes to the extreme in treating cultural regions as nearly monolithic political blocks (that is, civilizations), Huntington does well in thrusting cultural, religious, social, and historical as variables in the calculus that influences the foreign policy orientations of states and non-state organizations. Indeed, Huntington must be acknowledged as prescient in declaring the revival of religions, particularly non-Western religions, as remerging as an important cultural and political force in the world.(2)

Huntington-Barnett with a Social Level of Analysis: Gap Societies?
I agree with Barnett on the instability of regions lacking “global connectivity” and Huntington’s emphasis on cultural and religions as important variables in international politics and his concept of “civilization faultlines.” Barnett’s builds a framework for understanding all global and local conflicts in the long term. Huntington emphasizes culture as the central factor.

Barnett and Huntington’s frameworks are not mutually exclusive and this paper builds on their scholarship and research to explain the nature of this war. Both Huntington and Barnett rely on system – Civilization vs. Civilization, Core vs. Gap – and state level of analysis, where does one place non-state groups like Al-Qaeda, Al Takfir Wal Hijra, Hizb ut-Tahrir and including their support structures and sympathizers? Additionally, how we explain the presence of such groups in the Core states of Western Europe or within the Western Civilization?

An elegant solution to this problem is applying social cleavages as another level of analysis complementing the state and system level of analysis. Organizations like Al-Qaeda to Hizb ut-Tahrir are not just “terrorist groups” or “Islamist extremist,” but groups that represent a worldwide social movement that transcend nation-states, Core or Gap states or civilization blocks. Thus, there is a need to focus on different social groups inside Core and Gap states that are disconnected from the larger society and how they related to other states and societies globally.

Towards a More Total Concept of Warfare
Beyond abandoning the Western concept of state-to-state warfare, this is conflict where the enemy employs a new “combined arms” strategy beyond the traditional means of Western warfare and follows John Robb’s “Global Guerilla” on the more tactical and operational level.

In traditional military usage, the term “combined arms” is defined by the U.S. Department of Defense as “The full integration and application of two or more arms or elements of one Military Service into an operation”(3) -such as the integrated and coordinated use of infantry, tank, precision bombers, and reconnaissance under one unified command. As war on the social level against the states and other societies, we see “combined arms” taking not only a purely military dimension but the integration of a full spectrum of human concerns – political issues, social issues, cultural issues, religious issues, etc – under the banner of a unifying ideology. In this case, this ideology is religious in nature.

GWOT as a Radical, Global and Muslim Social Movement
The use of social, cultural and religious issues as important dimensions of the war has it roots in the religious nature of this war – that is, religious as defined by the enemy. Stemming from its roots from Islam, Salafi-Jihadist share the tradition of embracing religion as a totality inseparable from any social sphere. In contrasts with the Peace of Westphalia that helped brought about the separation of the Christian church away from the state in the West, Islam has kept itself as the sole truth for all totality – it applies to and encompasses all aspects of human activity. In the West, the Muslim Brotherhood was most famous in emphasizing this fact of Islam, with its statement of recognizing “Islam as a total system” and the “final arbiter of life in all of its categories.” The most famous quote by the Muslim Brotherhood was its founder’s, Hassan al-Banna, proclamation that “Islam is a faith and a ritual, a nation and a nationality, a religion and a state, spirit and deed, holy text and sword.”(4) Indeed, other Muslim scholars, such as Sayyid Qutb, have criticized the West for its corruption of Christianity with its “schizophrenic” separation between the secular and the sacred, between church and state.(5) In contrasts to Christianity today, he declares Islam as a “system [that] extend into all aspects of life; it discusses all minor and major affairs of mankind.”(6)

Indeed, by actively uniting and linking all human activities to a single religious belief, it is easy to see how local conflicts affecting Muslims can be exploited to be seen as an attack on the entire global Muslim community – the Ummah. This combined with the concept of jihad al-asghar (lesser jihad) explains the confluence of local conflicts involving Muslims – Chechnya, Palestinian Issue, Moro in the Philippines – to being seen as a global conflict against Muslims.(7) And borrowing from John Robb, we see how quickly the conflict can become a social movement and a “Global Swarm”.

The relationship between social conflict and the fanatical organizations that exploit these conflicts are not only self-reinforcing, but help export and spread instability in the region and internationally (as illustrated above). In the primary link, each local conflict begins to be linked to a cause (Islamist jihad) and is transformed to being seen as one of many conflicts (reaching towards secondary linkage). This conflation of the socio-political and socio-economic issues with the Islamist movement reaches the point that, in some cases, it is difficult to distinguish between what are social problems and what is part of the war.

Conclusion
As this war is more of cross between an insurgency and a social movement, there maybe no clean cessation of violence in the near or distant future. And in this conflict, there will be no battlefield,s, but rather our adversaries will be attached as a Global Swarm as Global Guerillas.

If the U.S. and it allies achive victory (how can we even defien this?), there will be neither a ceremony on USS Missouri nor televised collapse of an “Evil Empire”. In the words of the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, “Some people see war and peace as a light switch. When the lights are off, it’s peacetime. When the lights go on, it’s wartime. I see more of a dimmer switch. We’ll see the intensity wax and wane, but there will always be some level of conflict going on.” (8) Let us hope that the United States and its allies dims that switch, least it will be a long hard slog.

—–
Sources
1. Barnett, Thomas P.M. “The Pentagon’s New Map.” Esquire. March 2003. (17 November 2003).
2. Samuel Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, (New York: Touchstone, 1997), 95-101.
3. United States of America. Defense Department. DOD Dictionary of Military and 3. Associated Terms, 30 November 2004, (04 September 2004).
4. Daniel Pipes, “Fundamentalist Muslims Between America and Russia”, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1986, Accessed Online: http://www.danielpipes.org/article/279 (04 February 2004).
5. Berman, Paul. Terror and Liberalism, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 89.
6. Sayyid Qutb, Social Justice in Islam, (New Jersey: Islamic Publications International, 2000), 32.
7. For a comparative to the Islamic concept of jihad al-asghar within the Abrahamic religions, see the Judaic concept of milchemet mitzvah (obligatory war) and the Christian concept of Just War as described in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica.
8. No Author. “Changing and Fighting, Simultaneously”, 30 October, 2004, National Journal, Available at (03 January 2005).

NAZI! Communists! Hippies!

Its easy to hate and focus on someone when you have a nice quick, short name for them. Lashing out against “Nationalist Socialist”, “Total Socialist System under Centralized Planning” and “Free Spirited non-Conformist” is not easy to do. (And yes, I know some of my descriptions are not absolutely accurate and I included hippies as a joke.)

But same goes for what we are fighting against in this “Global War on Terrorism”. Just who are the bad guys? And what makes them different from the other past bad guys?

I think there is a true strategic and psychological weakness on our side to accurately name our adversary. The guys on the other side can do it easily, condemning us as secular, western, infidels, non-believers and so on. But what are they? How can we fight an enemy when we cant even describe them.

Islamists? “Those that hate our freedom”? Salafist? Global Guerillas?

Islamist or Muslim Fundamentalist sound fine, but we are not fighting some national Muslim Brotherhood movement. We are fighting 1000s of Islamicly inspired groups with a diverse range of immediate goals, motivation, tactics, doctrines…but a common enemy - the West.

There is a constant struggle to define our enemy (which is more of a “swarm” than a singular organizational entity) and we are unable to even define a name for it. This leaves us intellectual and conceptual vulnerable to the enemy.

In my future postings, I’ll dive through this issue deeper and try to offer some suggestions. It will definitely take some time for me to write on this.

This posting was inspired by a commenter on this blog who asked me why I used the word “Islamofacist” and by Dan Darling and John Robb who touched on this issue this week.

Quick Posting

The Strategic Overview: Tigerhawk’s Update

Back in 2003, Den Beste of USS Clueless wrote the greatest touchstone piece on the *Islamofacist war, writting out in a relatively short 20 pages the strategic overview of the war.

Today, Tigerhawk writes an excellent update to Den Beste’s essay. Its a must read piece.

Econbrowser on Peak Oil

Econbrowser blogger, James Hamilton economics prof of UCSF, speaks at the American Enterprise Institute on Peak Oil. Check out his transcript at Peak Oil News. Hamilton gets to the finer points on how the oil market works, the power of the market to manage Peak Oil (it wont be like the Long Emergency) And in the end, we’ll see three things:

• We’ll rely on “cruder” oil (more sulpher) which means more expensive to process to refine with stricter enviormental standards
• Intead of getting oil from Texas (which once pumped more oil than Saudi Arabia), we’re now relying on the Middle East…and after that’s done think Nigeria and Central Asian states or rough enviorments difficult places like ANWR
• All this points to higher likelihood of supply disruption and higher oil prices

*Some have asked why I haved used this term. I will post up a reply on this topic.

After 11 plus days, the French government sent in the Gendarmerie (Military Police) and enforced curfews…and thus, the riots appear to be abating. Sending in the military-police and curfew - as I mentioned at GlobalGuerillas - was something the French Government should have done during day 2 or 3.

The rivalry between Interior Minister Sarkozy and PM De Villepan could have led the government to delay action to make Sarkozy look bad. Or simply, the French government feared that such measures would escalate the issue. Either way, the real issue (and it always has been the issue) has been the consequences of the riots.

StrategyPage has a similar take my posting on “Paris Riots: Welcome to Netwar?”:

[the] street violence is partly a lark, because the kids know the cops are not going to use lethal force, and anyone who gets caught will, at worst, do maybe a year in the slammer (for burning cars looting stores). The drug gangs encourage the violence as a way to intimidate the cops. When the violence dies down, the gang bosses can threaten the local cops with a revival, if the cops do not back off (when it comes to the drug trade).

There are some Islamic radicals running around in all this, but they are a minority. The Moslem kids like to talk about respect and payback, but very few see this as a religious war. It’s become a sport, with various groups competing to cause the most destruction. Text messaging, Internet bulletin boards and email made it possible for the rioters to stay in touch and compare notes. The media coverage also encouraged the violence, giving the kids some positive (for them) feedback.

But now, nearly two weeks of street violence have thoroughly embarrassed the government so much that curfews and more arrests have taken some of the joy out of these Autumn antics. But it’s not jihad, and never has been. (Emphasis Mine)

I think I have empathized points similar to StrategyPage’s in my postings. The real question is will the Paris Riots give haste to the raise of the Muslim Street? Will it push France to concede more power to the Islamic Councils at these banlieue. Or will it simply fade from memory?
——————————————
Update from CounterTerrorism Blog:

Most of the rioters and especially the gang leaders are for now secular and very materialistic, but they will most probably join the rank of jihadis within three to five years if nothing is done.
The usual scenario goes like this: either the rioters end up in jail and are easily converted right there to Radical Islam or an imam from the banlieue convinces them to join the Jihad. At first, family, friends and cops find the transformation almost miraculous. From a drug trafficker, alcohol-drinking, girl-chasing individual, the thug becomes religious, even reserved, adopts a quieter lifestyle and no longer gets in trouble with the police. But this is a transfer of violence: instead of burning cars, the youngster focuses his hatred on the West and becomes a jihadi.
It is no coincidence that scores of French citizens are in Iraq fighting coalition troops (at least half a dozen Frenchmen have died in this fashion).

Again, what will happen is partly up to the French Government…

Introduction
While I still have the fear that we are seeing the raise of the Muslim Street in Europe, it is still far from the “Jihad in Europe” and “French Intifada” that we often see it described in the blogosphere. As of now, it still seems like male juvenile violence at a massive scale, only possible in the age of globalization (which provides for cheap and high-tech communication).

Christopher Dickey at Newsweek correctly describes the rioting as “incendiary flash-mobs”:

But by using cell-phone text messages to coordinate their incendiary flash-mobs, rioters in the city’s suburbs managed to burn thousands of cars, as well as buses, warehouses and stores

Back in 2001, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt at RAND, published “Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy”, which described the phenomena of Netwar in the context of transnational gangs to flash mobs and the Seattle Riots to Zapatistas. On Hooliganism in England, Netwar states:

Firms of opposing hooligans now use wireless technology and the Internet (email, etc.) for both marshalling their own combatants and challenging their opponents. For example, Milwall’s Bushwackers are believed to have used Internet tools (an interactive web site and real-time messaging) to organize and coordinate the violent activities of hooligans traveling to a match in Cardiff, where 14 people were hurt and 6 arrested.

Sounds familiar to anyone?

Welcome to Netwar.

Arquilla and Ronfeldt define Netwar as:

[The term] netwar refers to an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, short of traditional military warfare, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age.

These protagonists are likely to consist of dispersed organizations, small groups, and individuals who communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, often without a precise central command.
…
This includes familiar adversaries who are modifying their structures and strategies to take advantage of networked designs—e.g., transnational terrorist groups, black-market proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), drug and other crime syndicates, fundamentalist and ethnonationalist movements, intellectual-property pirates, and immigration and refugee smugglers. Some urban gangs, back-country militias, and militant single-issue groups in the United States have also been developing netwar-like attributes.

Like the rivaling English hooligans the Paris Rioters are doing battle – but unfortunately, its on the scale of bragging who burned the most cars, the most:

On Internet websites, young arsonists brag about their successes. Rioting, it seems, has become a trend sport, as youths in immigrant areas of provincial cities begin to rally to the call from Paris (source)

John Robb at Global Guerilla suspects that the riots are not solely motivated by the mindset of simple juvenile violence. What he sees is that in response to French Interior Minister Sarkozy campaign to crackdown on violence, the criminal elements took advantage of the death of the teenagers to help launch a loosely coordinate rioting to force Sarkozy to back down.

John Robb’s unique analysis on the Paris Riots is a breath of fresh air compared to the “Jihad in Europe” meme we are continually seeing or the social/cultural explanations. Robb’s view is very probably on the mark, but its impossible to tell (thus far), how involved the criminal elements are. Indeed, it would be naive to think there is no amount of criminal gangs supporting the rioters.

From: Netwar, p. 103

To return to Networks and Netwar and assuming that criminal gangs leveraging street mobs, we are seeing a combination of First Generation Gangs and most likely nascent Thirst Generation gangs – Hooligans and Drug Lords.

The difference between Second and Third Generation gangs is operations at a global level and political goals. In most cases, the political goals were focused on helping attain market protection for these organizations. As expounded in more depth by Manwaring’s “Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency”:

This political action is intended to provide security and freedom of movement for gang activities. As a consequence, the third generation gang and its leadership challenge the legitimate state monopoly on the exercise of control and use of violence within a given political territory.

Linking between Third Generation Gang, Rioters and Islamofacist Organizations
There has always been a fear of a linkup between gangs and terrorist organizations and indeed in South American, there are often one and the same. “Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency” goes into great length describing case studies in Central and South Americas.

The pervasiveness of the gangs and the narco-corruption influence it carries are some of the factors that lead to the empowerment of the third generation gangs in the Americas. Fortunately, the same cannot be said of France. These gangs have limited territory and the government is not so much paralyzed by narco-corruption but a lack of political will.

Besides the unknown factor of the criminal gangs in influencing the rioters, there is still the question of the potential role of Islamists. There are methods by which we can possiblely see a link up:

1. Outright collusion of the criminal element (and its rioters) with the Islamofacist.
2. Islamic Fundamentalism could be promoted to various ghettos as a method to “clean” the streets of gang and mob violence – a method of social reform. Indeed, this is an often heard argument of Islamic Fundamentalist – that they are simply trying to reform society and cleanse it of corruption (be it a woman’s ankle seen naked in public to narco trafficking). While reforming the ghettos - such reformist organizations could still keep the connections of the criminal elements to attain weapons and other materials for carrying acts of terrorism.

Amir Taheri takes a possible third route (Hat Tip to Belmont Club):

Some are even calling for the areas where Muslims form a majority of the population to be reorganized on the basis of the “millet” system of the Ottoman Empire: Each religious community (millet) would enjoy the right to organize its social, cultural and educational life in accordance with its religious beliefs.
…
“All we demand is to be left alone,” said Mouloud Dahmani, one of the local “emirs” engaged in negotiations to persuade the French to withdraw the police and allow a committee of sheiks, mostly from the Muslim Brotherhood, to negotiate an end to the hostilities.

In essence, the Islamofacist and the French Government could settle on a political agreement: the Islamofacist will “keep the peace” in the neighborhoods to quell the rioting. The French will get back their facade of domestic harmony. The Criminal Gangs secure their turf and have Sarkozy stopped (for now). The Islamofacist attain the position of power as the mediator between the ghettos and the French Government.

So what exactly will happen? Things are still too early and information is far too little. But in the end, I am optimistic that the French will pull through and find a proper strategy.
——–
Update:

Today’s Wall Steet Journal (Nov. 07) echoes similar remarks. Here’s an excerpt from “Muslim Groups May Gain Strength from French Riots“:

…
As France enters its 12th night of rioting, Islamic organizations like the Tabligh, which originated in the 1920s in India, stand to benefit from the unrest and emerge strengthened from it. The Tabligh advocates a strict adherence to Islam but also a disengagement from society.

While gangs of disaffected youths, mostly from Muslim families, continue to rampage, burning thousands of cars and ransacking entire neighborhoods, some of these organizations are positioning themselves as mediators who can bring back the order the government has been unable to restore.

These groups don’t preach violence, but they do advocate something that is troubling Europe’s secular democracies: that Muslims should identify themselves with their religion rather than as citizens. Effectively, they are promoting a separate society within society and that brand of Islamist philosophy is seeping into many parts of Western Europe. Countries from France and Germany to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands haven’t succeeded in integrating their Muslim minorities — and Islamic organizations have carefully positioned themselves to fill the breach.

The riots “are a blessing for them because it gives them the role of intermediary,” says Gilles Kepel, a scholar who has studied and written extensively about the rise of Islam in France. That, in turn, puts them in a stronger position “to force concessions from the state,” such as demanding a repeal of the law France passed last year banning headscarves from public schools, he says.
…
There isn’t anything inherently Muslim about the violence: Islamic groups appear to have played no part in stirring up the trouble, and few rioters seem to be using Islam to justify their attacks. On the contrary, many Islamic groups say they are trying to calm things down. But the bleak projects that ring Paris and France’s other big cities have long been fertile recruiting grounds for Islamic groups that preach a fundamentalist form of the religion that is often hard to square with Europe’s pluralistic societies.

While their mediation seems helpful in the short-term, these Islamic organizations end up further alienating Muslim youths from mainstream society because they teach an ideology that is in conflict with France’s secular ideals, says Malek Boutih, a former head of human-rights group SOS Racism. “They recruit, they teach the Quran and they try to orient everything around the mosque,” says Mr. Boutih. “That’s it.”

That is especially true of the Tabligh group here in Clichy. Founded in India in 1927, the Tabligh sends its missionaries to Islam’s troubled frontiers: Central Asia, Africa and Europe. Although it preaches a peaceful brand of Islam, some of its former members have founded terrorist groups and been expelled from countries like Kazakhstan for engaging in radicalism. French intelligence officials say up to 80% of Islamic extremists in France were once Tabligh members and have dubbed the organization the “antechamber of fundamentalism.”
[Fury in the Suburbs]

The group’s influence has grown even as France has tried to integrate Islam by giving Muslims a political voice. In 2003, the government set up a body meant to represent the Muslim community to the state, called the French Council of the Muslim Faith, and held elections to it. The government hoped the council would be a moderating influence. Instead, it has been riven by divisions and has given official representation to some of the most radical Islamic groups in the country.

Quick Posting for Today…

I’ve been reading alot lately of the portrayal Paris Riots as the Intifada - and I don’t buy it yet. While the rioters appear to be mostly run by Muslims immigrants, the attacks so far has been of random violence and at most against symbols of the state (Trains, Police etc). I don’t see youth with green flags burning churches yet. Heck, I haven’t heard any reports of anyone carrying a political banner yet or shooting a political slogan yet. Have you?

I think much of the blogosphere is jumping the gun on the Intifada slant - but its definitely a realistic fear of what may come if things in France and Europe don’t change soon.

The violence has so far ranged from the usual stone throwing and molotov cocktails to evil and mindless:

A handicapped woman was doused with petrol and set on fire by youths during another night of rioting in Paris.

The 56-year-old suffered third degree burns to 20% of her body in the attack.

Witnesses said a youth poured petrol over the woman and then threw a Molotov cocktail on to the bus she was travelling on in the suburb of Sevran.

Over at Instapundit, a reader, David Mosier, attempts to bring some greater context for the riots:

If the rioting goes on for another couple of nights and spreads to other areas of the country, you’ve got 1968 all over again. France is ready to explode, as it was in 1968, and the all-night riots are lighting the fuse. Will Chirac be able to prevent an explosion that shakes the whole country? I doubt it. There’s too much pent up frustration in France, and not just among young Muslims. They might be the group that kicks off the insurrection, but once it’s kicked off, everybody in France with a beef (and that’s everybody)will join in. Just like they did in 1968. University students started it with student strikes in Nanterre (note, not in Paris)and it spread from there. Before it was done, almost every organized, or unorganized, group in the country had joined in to bring down deGaulle. It would seem Chirac’s time is short. France hasn’t had a proper Gallic explosion since 1968; it’s long overdue.

I am unaware if a large cross-segment of France shares some sort of frustration at the government or the state of the nation. But, I can image that if the riots take a political tinge - antiglobalization, anti-immigration laws etc - then we’ll start to have ourselves a major movement similar to the May 1968 scenerio Mosier is talking about.

On the other side, I am sure there are radical Muslims in France and beyond considering taking advantage of this raw violence and “Islamofacist-ify” the violence.

But the more realistic scenario I still see is that if violence continues to be principally perpetuated by Muslim youth is beginning of Europe’s Muslim Street.

So which scenario will happen? May 1968? Intifada? Muslim Street? Nothing? We’ll have to keep watch.

Day 7 of the Paris Riots

AP 11.03.05 Christohe Ena

Paul Belein has an excellent commentary on the Paris Riot (and in Demark) and what it means for Europe’s future and what is holding Europe’s politicians back . Hat tip to Instapundit for the link to Paul.

There are always talking heads and pundits analyzing the “Arab Street”. They have spread the constant fear of a US going so far as to upset the “Arab Street”, igniting radical revolutions against the authoritative governments throughout the Middle East. This fear is heard countless times from US support of Israel, authoritative governments and from Operation Desert Storm (Persian Gulf War) to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

All experts speak of this powerful “Arab Street”. Thomas Friedman mentions it countlessly. George Tenet in his “World Threat 2001” briefing before the Senate talks of “The recent popular demonstrations in several Arab countries—including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Jordan—in support of the Palestinian intifada demonstrate the changing nature of activism of the Arab street”.

But now we see we’ve been looking at the right religion, but wrong ethnicity and region. We should be worried about Europe’s growing Muslim Street.

An “Arab Street” revolt is simply a revolt in an Arab state – states in a region already hostile to the West. But, a revolt of Europe’s Muslim Street threatens to constrain the birthplace of Western Civilization itself.

Here’s an except from Paul, touching on why the Europe’s politicians have been hesitant and constrained in their actions against the growing problem:

The first one is that the Muslim population in Western Europe has become so large that politicians fear what it might be capable of.
…
A second reason why some politicians try to appease the Muslims is that these are now a substantial segment of the voting population. Demographics are deciding the fate of Europe’s democracy.

Europe has already been hesitant in pursuing any bold policies that involve Muslims and Arab nations, unlike the United States. After the Paris Riots - there will be no doubt that Europe would bulk at any risk of upsetting its “Muslim Street’.

Will this further isolate the United States on its “Global War on Terrorism”?

In terms of openly stated policy and openly seen actions by Europe’s leaders - the answer is yes. But, when it comes to Europe’s domestic security services - undoubtedly, they will step up their efforts, which currently are far more extensive than the U.S. (If some Americans fear the Patriot Act and Bu$h Hitler Police State ™, they would shriek at horror at France and UK’s anti-terror policies).

The War on Terror is also a war on political will between the Islamofacist and everyone else – this is something Europe has been short on and now it will be shorter still.

Until the day Europe comes around, the Paris Riots mean further isolation for Bush’s policies and a set-back against the War on Terror (to use the US Govt’s term).

Some have argued that the Paris Riots will awaken the French and Europe population to the growing issue and threat they have failed to confront decisively. Judging from what we hear from the French Press (specifically from opposition party leaders), it seems its Sarkozy that is under fire for trying to lay down the law. A bad sign of things to come…
————————————————————————————–
Update: Belmont Club has just posted its own (and opposite) take:

“What events in France have done is discredit the liberal recipe so badly that even those who are not prepared to admit that American policy may have been right must now root around for an alternative theory. “

I hope he’s right, but I am pessimistic. Maybe in the long term, it will.

The following is more of a commentary/opinion rather than StrategyUnit usual goal of analyses on issues and policies related to security issues.
————————————————————–
Update 10.03.05 - A Retraction and Correction:
1) After reading, researching and looking into the issue, I would like to retract my position of countering The Wretched at the Belmont Club
2) After reviewing the comment by Carsten Agger below, I have to put in question the reports of the riot in Denmark. Carsten has mentioned that this could really be a simple situation of alienated and jobless youth. Until, I can verify from additional sources - I’ll hold on the Denmark Riot issue. Thanks Carsten for your input.
3) Check out the follow-up posting “Paris Riots - Raise of the Europe’s Muslim Street, not Middle East’s Arab Street”
————————————————————–

A Restive Population in Europe
It is now day five of the riots in Clichy-sous-Bois, a suburb outside of Paris, which has now spread to other suburbs, Sevran, Neuilly-sur-Marne and Bondy [1]. The riots was sparked when allegedly two immigrant youths were electrocuted after coming into contact with a transformer while under fleeing from the police. During the riot on Sunday, a tear-gas that launched at a mosque serving only to exacerbate the riots.

At the same time, sectarian riots have sparked in Denmark:

“Rosenhøj Mall has several nights in a row been the scene of the worst riots in Århus for years. “This area belongs to us”, the youths proclaim. Sunday evening saw a new arson attack.
…
We are tired of what we see happening with our prophet. We are tired of Jyllands-Posten. I know it isnt you, but we wont accept what Jyllands-Posten has done to the prophet”, he says aggressively, and the others nod approvingly. [2]”

The last bit is a reference to the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, which recently has been sent death threats over a drawing of the Prophet Muhammad by a cartoonist.

While those that support Huntington’s “Clash of Civilization” would not be surprised, those on the other wide would disagree. They would point to social issues being the root cause: from the plight of the immigrant community in the slum housing in French suburbs to the general alienation and seemingly self-segregation of Muslim immigrant community throughout Europe. What I’ve learned from my own study of this- both views cannot be discounted nor are they mutually exclusive.

From Discontent to Jihad
Taking from the “Other Side” Robert Leiken (Foreign Affairs Aug 05) recently wrote: As the French academic Gilles Kepel acknowledges, “neither the blood spilled by Muslims from North Africa fighting in French uniforms during both world wars nor the sweat of migrant laborers, living under deplorable living conditions, who rebuilt France (and Europe) for a pittance after 1945, has made their children … full fellow citizens.” [3]

With no support network and a sense of alienation among the youth, radical Islamic foundations would only welcome them with open arms. It is no surprise that France has been repeatedly targeted for bombings, including more recently a plot to shoot down aircrafts in France.

Alienation of Muslim immigrants goes on to link up with the Global Islamofacist Movement and Insurgency, a self reinforcing network linking all oppression of Muslims (real and imagined) as part of a global struggle:

(More on the explanation behind this graph in part 2)

Robert Leiken goes on to divide the jihadist into two types of immigrant: outsiders and insiders. Outsiders were the newly arrived immigrants who served as the grunts and cannon-fodder (sometimes literally) of the jihadist organization; some of them may be radical imams seeking asylum but with funding from Saudi Arabia and seeking to start a jihadist network. The insiders are second generation immigrants, who are westernized in education yet anti-western and generally the leaders (think Zacarias Moussaoui).

Yet unfortunately the story doesn’t stop there…
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Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Monitor and RFE/RL has a good roundup of the Nalchik raid. All of them supporting StrategyPage’s position of another guerilla war coming to Russia

Key quote from a Russian legislator:

“It was more like a mutiny, an attempt to seize power in the city, and we should label it properly.” Ilyukhin added that the Russian security agencies cannot guarantee that there won’t be a repetition of the Nalchik events somewhere else in the North Caucasus and that the situation in the region, in his opinion, has no military solution.

From the Duma Security Committee member Viktor Ilyukhi, after meeting with the Interior Minister, the Director of the FSB and others on Nalchik
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 9, No. 198, Part I, 20 October 2005)

Jamestown’s round-up confirms that Nalchik is part of a wider guerilla war, albeit still in its early stages, at least for Kabarindo-Balkaria:

(more…)

This is continuing with yesterday’s post “Great Game Revisited (again) and the Green Revolution“.

On the Caucasus
Any attention the U.S. press pays attention to the southern Russia is only limited to Afghanistan and more to Central Asia, with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgystan. But not enough attention is paid to the deteriorating situation in the Caucasus and the dangerous consequences that it may represent.

As I’ve written in a recent post, the scale (over 200+), composition (local) and targets (security installations) of the Nalchik Raid in southern Russia represents a huge blow to Russia’s control over its troubled Caucasus region, which includes Chechnya. Indeed, while Putin and the Russian elites fret over the Color Revolution (Orange, Tulip, Rose) that has reverberated throughout the former Soviet Space, a Green Revolution is increasingly destabilize southern Russia thanks partly to Russia’s own ineptness:

Accepting that post-Soviet revolutions are not organized from outside but driven by public anger against corrupt authoritarian regimes is all but impossible for Putin and his courtiers. It would inevitably lead to the conclusion that the street battles in Nalchik were not a terrorist attack but an outburst of accumulated rage caused by police brutality and officially sanctioned persecution of Muslims (Vremya novostei, October 14). (Jamestown Foundation, emphasis mine)

Drawing from the Nalchik Raid, Andrei Smirnov at Jamestown gravely stated regarding the state of security in the Caucasus:

The Nalchik attack showed that the rebels in the North Caucasus maintain sufficient military capabilities to attack and temporarily hold one of the largest cities in the North Caucasus and could have enough capability to seize control of a whole region in the near future. The attack on Nalchik sent a clear warning to Putin and his team that they are outgunned in the Caucasus. (Jamestown Foundation, empahsis mine)

To add to that, the Nalchik Raid demonstrates that the Islamofacist have the intiative. They can choose when and where to attack, putting the Russian security forces on the defensive.

The Kremlin and the local governments inaptness in the Caucasus combined with the situation in Chechnya Conflict risk spilling an arc of fire across the region - where the vacuum of Russian power and legitimacy would lead to the raise and spread of radical Islam, as a significant movement.

Once reaching a sizable movement any turn to suppress them violent by Russian forces would be seen, not only as harsh and repressive, but also taking on the same tinge of apartheid and ethnic cleansing. That would be the tipping point, where the Caucasus would be lost to everything, but the radical extremist.

It would lead to the creation of a region far worse than Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, closer to Russia (obviously), closer to Europe and closer to the enormous energy resources and pipeline infrastructure in the region and in close-by Central Asia.

Central Asia and the Caucasus share the pecular trait of being important geopolitical points, yet so little understood or cared about in the mainstream media. To do my part in remedying that, I’d like to point out to a great article on Central Asia (which more often gets some U.S. media coverage) and contrast that with recent events in the Caucasus (which rarely ever does).

On Central Asia
Tech Central Station has a new article by Ariel Cohen, of the Heritage Foundation, featuring the (tired) title “The Great Game Returns“, where he covers Condoleeza Rice’s imporant trip throughout Central Asia.

Central Asia is the important flash point for the United States, China and Russia (its former imperial power) for several reasons:

• Most hot on everyone’s mind is the resurgence of Islam and the threat of radicalization - of a reason known to embrace sufism and a distinct school of Islam
• Central Asia, while landlocked, has a enormous amount of natural gas resource and a good amount of oil. Kazakhstan alone is set on an ambitious path to exceed the production of the North Sea

Key points from Ariel Cohen:

[On the Purpose of the Condi Rice Trip]
The visit demonstrated Sec. Rice’s balancing act skills. On the one hand, she needs to propel further President Bush’s democratization agenda. But on the other, just like in the Middle East, the imperatives of the war on terrorism and U.S. energy security dictate a more Realpolitik approach.

The stakes are high. Afghanistan and Central Asia are where the rubber of President Bush’s democratization doctrine meets the rocky road of authoritarianism. What’s more, Central Asia is important as a major source of oil and gas. By 2015, the Caspian Sea basin, including Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, will produce four million barrels a day — more than Kuwait and Iraq today combined. The region is also surrounded by the emerging giants, energy-starved India and China, and bordered by key Islamist states Iran and Pakistan.

[On the challenge from Russia and China]
In August SCO sent a strong message to its Central Asian members when they conducted unprecedented joint military maneuvers in the Far East. The new de-facto Moscow-Beijing bloc is aimed at U.S. “hegemony” as well as to American rhetoric of democracy.

In the meantime, Islamist radicals are spreading their tentacles in the impoverished and drug-ridden villages and slums of the region. Hizb ut-Tahrir, a global Sunni clandestine organization which aims to overthrow secular regimes and create a Califate, has made Uzbekistan its primary target. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is allied with Al Qaeda and active in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s border areas.

[Reason for the Special Rice Visit to Kazakhstan]
…
Kazakhstan may be a key to U.S. interests in the region. As Nazarbaev announced in his September speech to the parliament, in ten years his country may surpass Kuwait and Nigeria as an oil exporter, pumping over 2.5 million barrels a day.
…
One hopes that Sec. Rice also encouraged Mr. Nazarbaev to finally authorize construction of a pipeline connecting Kazakh oil fields to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline which takes Caspian oil to the Mediterranean and global markets.

She could also praise and encouraged Kazakhstan to promote its unique model of peace and harmony among Muslims, Christians and Jews around the Islamic world. Finally, she could encourage Kazakhstan to sponsor the U.S. gaining observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, so that Washington can alleviate Beijing and Moscow’s fears as to its intentions in the heartland of Eurasia while continue playing an important role there.

I think its a great summary, but on Kazakhstan, I ‘d like to add one more thing to place Kazakhstan’s relationship with the U.S. in greater context: President Nazarbayev has almost alwaysed followed a multi-vectored foreign policy, trying to balance all the major powers in the region:

• Nazarbayev has sought good terms with Russia, its larger and power neighbor in the north and also the original homeland for a sizeable number of Russians in Kazakhstan
• At the same time, Nazarbayev has reached out to China. This year China and Kazakhstan completed the creation of a major pipeline expected to deliver a million bbl of oil per day to China. Before the Sino-Kazakh pipeline, Kazakhstan was wholely dependent on Russia for export of its oil. They are also looking to export Kazakhstan’s natural gas through China.

With Kazakhstan already playing well with Russia and China, naturally Kazakhstan needs to pay attention to the other player in Central Asia: the United States. Especially with the lost of Uzbekistan as a partner in Central Asia, U.S. is in dire need of finding other partners - although Kazakhstan would probably never reach the level of military cooperation with the U.S. that Uzbekistan once did.

And with all this in mind, we move on to the Caucaus…

On the Caucasus
Check back tomorrow…

As you can tell from my postings, John Robb at the Global Guerillas Blog is one of my favourite analyst when it comes to fourth generation war and views on the war in Iraq. Today, Robb writes an excellent op-ed in the New York Times on the nature of the adversaries in Iraq and why putting down the insurgency will be so difficult for the U.S. and the Iraqi Government.

In a few days, I’ll put my two-cents on the “El Salvadore” option that he mentions.

First, out-innovating the insurgency will most likely prove unsuccessful. The insurgency uses an open-source community approach (similar to the decentralized development process now prevalent in the software industry) to warfare that is extremely quick and innovative. New technologies and tactics move rapidly from one end of the insurgency to the other, aided by Iraq’s relatively advanced communications and transportation grid - demonstrated by the rapid increases in the sophistication of the insurgents’ homemade bombs. This implies that the insurgency’s innovation cycles are faster than the American military’s slower bureaucratic processes (for example: its inability to deliver sufficient body and vehicle armor to our troops in Iraq).

Second, there are few visible fault lines in the insurgency that can be exploited. Like software developers in the open-source community, the insurgents have subordinated their individual goals to the common goal of the movement. This has been borne out by the relatively low levels of infighting we have seen between insurgent groups. As a result, the military is not going to find a way to chop off parts of the insurgency through political means - particularly if former Baathists are systematically excluded from participation in the new Iraqi state by the new Constitution.

Third, the United States can try to diminish the insurgency by letting it win. The disparate groups in an open-source effort are held together by a common goal. Once the goal is reached, the community often falls apart. In Iraq, the original goal for the insurgency was the withdrawal of the occupying forces. If foreign troops pull out quickly, the insurgency may fall apart. This is the same solution that was presented to Congress last month by our generals in Iraq, George Casey and John Abizaid.

Unfortunately, this solution arrived too late. There are signs that the insurgency’s goal is shifting from a withdrawal of the United States military to the collapse of the Iraqi government. So, even if American troops withdraw now, violence will probably continue to escalate.

What’s left? It’s possible, as Microsoft has found, that there is no good monopolistic solution to a mature open-source effort. In that case, the United States might be better off adopting I.B.M.’s embrace of open source. This solution would require renouncing the state’s monopoly on violence by using Shiite and Kurdish militias as a counterinsurgency. This is similar to the strategy used to halt the insurgencies in El Salvador in the 1980’s and Colombia in the 1990’s. In those cases, these militias used local knowledge, unconstrained tactics and high levels of motivation to defeat insurgents (this is in contrast to the ineffectiveness of Iraq’s paycheck military). This option will probably work in Iraq too.

The threat of Islamofacism (using Christopher Hitckins’s term) is what appears on the new everyday. Most recently, we’ve seen the arrests in France over bombing plots against the Metro and the terror alert in New York City.

While the Public is fearful of the next Bali Bombing or Madrid Bombing, a truly global catastrophe would result from a disruption in the global energy infrastructure; Energy is Modernity’s Achilles Heel. Energy concerns have been growing over unease over dependence on Middle East oil and raising oil prices. But what should be the biggest concern is the threat of Peak Oil changing the geopolitical landscape and attacks on the oil infrastructure.

Bombings targeting the deaths of civilians are all tragic in the sense of the direct effect on human lives – but a major energy crunch could bring modernity to a halt and surely fuel (no pun intended) wars over energy resources. Indeed, Hurricane Katrina and Rita demonstrated the vulnerability of the U.S. oil infrastructure system – lost oil rigs, refineries offline, fuel shortages and scenes of cars running out of fuel as people attempt to evacuate.
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Recently Fitzgerald at Jihad Watch criticized the short comings of the term “Clash of Civilizations” to describe the “Global War on Terror”, offering the alternative view that “truthful description of the conflict as one motivated by a belief-system, the belief-system of Islam”. (link)

I took a differing view on this at Jihadwatch here…and here is a rebuttal by a follow poster.

The term “Clash of Civilizations” and the “Global War on Terror” are short-sighted and misleading. I think Fitzgerald and I agree on that.

But, Fitzgerald and I differ when he states that the “truthful description of the conflict as one motivated by a belief-system, the belief-system of Islam”.

Au contraire, I think its far more complicated than that…

Islam is being exploited as a vehicle for fighting what many see as their continuing oppression of Muslims by non-Muslims and/or oppressive governments. Look at Thailand, Philippines, Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine, Kosovo, Muslims in Eurrope and so on. Conflicts there can be easily seen (true or not) as a conflict between oppressed Muslims and non-Muslims or the government. Additionally, in Uzbekistan and elsewhere, Islam is seen as the alternative and solution to an otherwise corrupt and inept government system.

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