StrategyUnit

Summary
While intentional or not, Israel’s incursion into Lebanon (aimed at Hezbollah) is now a proxy war against Iran via Hezbollah and Hamas, a violent mirroring of the US-Iran maneuverings in the UN and in Iraq. The incursion also demonstrates how powerful the Iranian hand is with Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Sadr and others in Iraq and influence in Afghanistan, relative to the U.S. and Israel and even the other Middle Eastern states like Egypt or Saudi Arabia.

Israel’s endgame is not clear, as it cannot militarily defeat Hezbollah unless it shuts down Syria’s border with Lebanon (along with a conventional ground offensive), which would bring Syria into an open conflict with Israel, as well as, Israel incurring the wrath of the region and the world for widening the war.

Being a guerilla force, Hezbollah can take the blows of the IDF very resiliently. Even with infrastructure degraded and supplies gone, Hezbollah can afford to wait and rebuild slowly and even bring Israel into wider protracted war on Lebanese territory. Indeed, as long as the border between Syria and Lebanon remains open, Hezbollah will have a safe-haven for retreat as well an area to gather supplies.

A far worst case scenario is for the Lebanese government and the military to throw its weight behind Hezbollah. This is something it has not clearly done yet, but if the war widens and causalities mount, Israel may find itself in an open war against an Iranian-backed Lebanese-Syrian front on the north and Hamas in the east.

One possible end game is for Israel is to find, rescue and bring home the two IDF soldiers, granting Israel the ability to withdraw while saving face abroad and more importantly at home.

The better solution would be to use the Lebanese incursion as a platform to pressure Lebanon, the U.S. and others to finally act on fulfilling UN Resolution 1559, disarming Hezbollah.

To lay the ground work, Israel must make it explicitly clear that its offensive maneuvering is an attack on Hezbollah, not the Lebanese people, the government - which rules out the bombings in Beirut and other major Lebanese cities. It should attempt to clandestinely reach out to the fragile Lebanese government led by Prime Minister Fuad Saniora, pushing it to deploy its army against Hezbollah in the south in the name of “reasserting” control of the south.

While a realistic assessment of the current situation forbids such an optimistic assessment, there is some truth when Kyle Spector of Foreign Policy declares:

“But some Lebanese and other Arabs around the region (including the Saudis), while obviously not in favor of the Israeli assault, are seeing this crisis as a death knell for Hezbollah and quietly cheering it on”

This is not a guaranteed death kneels for Hezbollah as Spector calls it, but the dislike of Hezbollah in Lebanon and regionally is there – Israel needs to take advantage of it.

At the same time, US and its partners must work via to diplomatic channels - be it public, the UN or other channels - to get Syria and Iran to back-off. How is another question, but it must be done as alternative scenarios are dire.

Perhaps the second option is being carried out by US, Israel and its allies. Time will tell what paths history will take.

Some Suggested Readings

• NYT’s “Israel’s Invasion, Syria’s War” by Michael Young
• “Crisis in the Middle East: Local Bloggers Report” by The Truth Laid Bear

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Down at the Winds of Change.net, the Armed Liberal and Trent Telenko have been discussing what to do with the Iranian situation. I have made my own comments at WoC, but I am repeating them here because I think laying out the choices in this manner really helps in providing constructive discussion on the Iranian Question.

Weighing the Concequences: Doing some Bombing v. Just Doing Nothing
Note that the “Doing Some Bombing” concequences are mostly short-term issues, while “Just Doing Nothing” are long term issues.

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Intoduction
(Via John Robb) Martin Van Creveld, military strategist who foresaw the raise of non-western warfare (e.g. War on Terrorism) to the shrinking of the tradition role of states, has written in Forward Newspaper (Major Jewish-American publication) an gives his pessimistic analysis on the War on Iraq:

[A] divided, chaotic, government-less Iraq is very likely to become a hornets’ nest. From it, a hundred mini-Zarqawis will spread all over the Middle East, conducting acts of sabotage and seeking to overthrow governments in Allah’s name.

While coming from one of the brightest minds in military thinking, Van Creveld’s opinion is neither unique nor shocking. But what struck me was how John Robb headlined that particular excerpt above: “Iraq in turn destabilizes the region as global guerrillas spread out.”

In the words of Thomas Barnett: Its about Connectivity, Stupid!

As mentioned in a paper I wrote, the principal argument I had made on supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom was that “U.S. intervention aiding in the creation of a liberal democratic Iraq is key in bringing not only liberalism to the region, but in essence exporting a new regime of strategic security to the Middle East.” In short, a liberal Iraq would reach out and bring economic connectivity to the stagnate Middle East region and with it a new security regime.

On the opposite end…One of the more saner arguments against the war, as Van Crevald said, was that the intervention would ultimately fail, launching hundreds of mini-Zarqawis and min-Bin Ladens all over the Middle East.

But in essence, these two arguments are the one and the same and I agree with both:
1. A free, liberal and democratic Iraq can act as a hub to further economic (and maybe even political) connectivity in the region stimulating economic growth and with it regional stability.
2. A divided, failed Iraqi state can act as a hub (a “bazaar of violence” in John Robb’s term) that will reach out to export instability to neighbouring countries while also attracting many to join Al-Qaida-related groups in Iraq.

Its about all connectivity, but different sides of the same coin. Thus, as made time and time again by many - the question is not if we will withdraw from Iraq, but as the Economist puts it “Not whether, but how, to withdraw“.

The War in Iraq is about connectivity. Originally, it was under the idealistic impression that the only connectivity possible was the championing of liberalism in the Middle East, but in the current sobering reality - we know that connectivity cuts both ways.

What connectivity will the New Iraq ultimately bring to the Middle East?

One thing for sure is, if we withdraw unilaterally now, we’ll surrender the chance for liberal connectivity.

Howdy All Y’All…Happy Thanksgiving Day.

Here’s quick Weekend Reading…just in case you need a break from all that turkey and gravy. By the way, I’ve been doing some light posting this past two weeks, but I’ll start going back to the normal beat of things soon.

OxBlog on Jame’s Fellow’s “Why Iraq Has No Army” in December’s Atlantic Monthly

David Adensik does an analysis of James Fallows’ cover story in the Atlantic monthly “Why Iraq Has No Army”. The article has caused such a buzz that even “George Stephanopoulous attempted to use the article to cross-examine Donald Rumsfeld on Sunday morning.”

I agree with David Adesnik that despite the hype of a title, Fallows doesnt really say anything new nor goes into depth about anything groundbreaking. Adesnik also the lack of definately strong position in the article (from critical/pessimistic to hawkish) as reflective of the overall difficult position of the Democrats:

“So is there a third way that will allow Democrats to both criticize the war and be seen as hawkish? Yes there is. They can click their heels three times and say “I agree with John McCain.”"

The article is available for subscribers only, but if you would like a copy let me know and I can email it over. And, dont forget your local library (via online database) may carry a copy.

Oil Drum’s “There’s A New Kid In Town — Iran Versus Kazakhstan”

I’ve done an extensive research on Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and energy resources as part of my thesis in college, so its interesting (but not too surprising) to see Oil Drum’s “There’s A New Kid In Town — Iran Versus Kazakhstan” - which boldy proclaims the growing importance of Kazakhstan OVER Iran on energy resources:

Iran is still a giant and Kazakhstan is a middle tier country among the world’s oil suppliers. Iran produced 4081/kbd in 2004, 5.2% of the world’s total while Kazakhstan produced 1295/kbd, a paltry 1.6% percent of the whole. Iran has 132.5 billon barrels in proven reserves, 11.1% of the world’s total while Kazakhstan has 39.6 billion barrels, a 3.3% world share. But let’s look into our chrystal ball to see what the future may look like.
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Around the years 2008 to 2009 period, Kazakhstan is exporting more total oil supply to the OECD countries, China and (perhaps) India than Iran is (Empahsis mine)

Eurasianet’s “China joins the Central Asian Base Race”

Stephen Blank of Eurasianet writes on China’s recent move to secure a military base in Kyrgyzstan and even in Uzbekistan, which the US has recently been kicked out from.

While Blank focuses on Chinese miltiary presence on Central Asia, we should not forget the joint Chinese-Pakistan naval base in Gwadar, Pakistan.

Beijing’s search for a base has occurred against a backdrop of growing regional militarization and an intensification of great power rivalry in Central Asia. Thus, China’s requests of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, even if made sotto voce, have served to heighten the geopolitical jockeying in the region. It also suggests a growing willingness entertain the use of the military instrument to address regional issues. This cannot be considered a good sign.

While SCO (which includes Russia, China all all major Central Asian states) asked for the US militray to leave Central Asia, Blank correctly points out that Russia come out more strongly against a Chinese over a US presence in Central Asia.

In the UK: “Gas industry on brink of winter crisis”

The OilDrum and EnergyBulletin have been covering the less known natural gas issues that faces the US, UK and others, but here’s a mainstream news on UK’s winter energy crisis:

The country’s gas industry is on a knife edge this winter and could tip into crisis if there is a major breakdown in its ageing North Sea fields and pipelines, analysts said on Thursday.

Europe’s biggest consumer is fast running out of gas from the fields that once made it self sufficient and kept prices among the lowest in Europe. Today, UK gas is the world’s costliest fuel and winter supply will be the tightest in memory.Government ministers are under pressure to explain how one of the world’s richest nations has left its energy policy hostage to the weather and ageing North Sea equipment.

Introduction
For many weeks we’ve heard murmurings about a new strategy from the Bush Administration on Iraq. From Condi Rice’s testimony to the Senate to Khalilzad on Newsweek, now we see may a glimpse of that with the recent launch of “Operation Steel Curtain.” In essence, the strategy in Iraqi is moving from a “search and destroy” to a “clear, hold and rebuild” strategy.

As part of Operation Steel Curtain, 2,500 US and 1,500 Iraqi troops were deployed to the Anbar region in a bid to secure porous Syria-Iraq borders ahead of the December elections. Tribal militias were also said to be involved to support the US-Iraqi troops. The first phase appears to be to dislodge the insurgents from Husaybah (city of 30,000) and secure the city.

Instead of launching major offensives (seemingly every three months) to “break the insurgent’s back” as we all too often hear about, the new strategy is to this is to clear a region of insurgents; deny territory and resources to insurgents; and to rebuild the region to win local support. This strategy is, of course, nothing new.

Added to this, is the inclusion of tribal militias to augment and support the Iraqi government troops in the areas that are cleared.

Clear, Hold and Rebuild
Elaine M. Grossman from Inside Washington Publishers writes a length account of change in strategy. Here is a lengthy excerpt:

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Update 01: See Dan Darling’s response here at Winds of Change.

As you can tell from my postings, I haven’t made much commentary regarding the situation in Iraq. This is chiefly because others (see the links on the right) already do a great job at analyzing the situation and the situation in Iraq is at many times too fluid and opaque for me to make heads or tails of it.

Here’s an example, which I pointed out in a comment at WoC, both from October 23, 2005.

This is a comment by Dan Darling, in a posting discussing the Iraqi Referendum:

I actually think that violence has been going down (at least from where it was when the insurgents started mounting attacks in a big way in April) for a longer period than that, particularly with regard to the number as well as the scope of mass casualty terrorist attacks in the country.
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That said, a drop in violence is still a drop in violence, as is the fact that a lot of Sunnis are now engaged in the political process, even as an opposition force, rather than operating outside of it. As I think Eric has noted in the past, there are definite fault lines between the various insurgent groups, some of which are far more open to political participation than others.

And over at Global Guerillas, John Robb mentions, while discussing a recent halt in Iraqi oil exports:

On a side note, the US military’s inability to reverse neither the Iraqi insurgency’s tempo of operations nor its rate of innovation has created a stressed system that may result in a moral turning point. As one analyst suggested to me, it is only a matter of time now before Iraqi guerrillas overrun a US fire-base. The loss of life and drama from that event could cause a rapid collapse in our moral cohesion.

So, which is it? To be fair, Dan Darling mentions that the insurgents seem to shifting from targeting Iraqi civilians to U.S. military. Regardless, Dan Darling points to a drop of violence and possible political engagement with certain segments of the insurgents. John Robb blatantly states that the tempo of the insurgents haven’t decreased, that they have crippled Iraq’s oil operations and that it was only a matter of time before the insurgents overrun a U.S. firebase.

So, which is? Is it either/or? Or perhaps oddly, are the insurgents becoming more political open as their tempo of operation increasing? What is going on there in Iraq?

PS: From my understanding, Firebase (FB) is a temporary forward encampment providing artillery support.