StrategyUnit

Introduction
The Economist earlier last month did an update on America’s relationship in Central Europe, the area earlier hailed by Sec. of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as part of the “New Europe.” While I applaud his speech as brillent tactical manuverings (Reminding France/Germany that they’re other Europeans beside themselves), it seems like besides building military bases little is changing to reach out the the people themselves:

“America tends to underestimate the political cost of this. One post-communist minister recalls trying vainly to convince his American counterparts that staying in Iraq was rather unpopular at home. American military aid to the new democracies has been stingy. And the cost and hassle of America’s visa policies grate harshly. “Estonians don’t understand why their sons are dying in Iraq for democracy and freedom, and yet their families can’t get visas for the United States,” says Toomas Hendrik Ilves, a former foreign minister.

So far, only Slovenia’s 1.9m people have visa-free travel to America. Poland and the Czech Republic have lobbied hard; so did Mrs Vike-Freiberga on her recent trip. But there is little sign of change. In most post-communist countries, each visa application costs a non-refundable $100—a week’s wages. In Romania, even the appointment costs $11, for seven minutes of telephone time.” (Empahsis Mine)

Comment
To be fair to the Bush Administration, the US has lobbied hard for the “Big Bang” approach that has led many of “New Europe” states to be accepted into the EU and has given Central Europe some voice in the world stage through branding them as part of a “New Europe”.

However, the US must follow though on building a relationship with these states. While sending troops to Iraq has bought countries like Estonia closer ties to the US, simple things like visa-restriction fail to show what clear benefit such sacrifices provide back.

Just like at home, the Bush Administration should pursue a campaign to show the people - of Estonia, Poland etc - the benefits of closer ties with the US. Currently, we’re not doing that (or enough) and worse than that we’re losing our chance to prove these people right the next time around.

Additionally, while countries like Bulgaria and Slovenia are small, they represent members of a growing bloc - the European Union - and a post-nation-state identify of “Europeanness”. The US must reach out - both at government and public level - to those who are receptive to the US.

Indeed, reaching out to the Central Europe region (where in Hungary there is a statue in honor of Ronald Reagan in remembrance of the Cold War), can act as a balance to the German and French states, while the US could also provide security against the fear of a possibly reassertive and aggressive Russia (as long as the EU remains anemic in security terms).

Let’s hope that the Post-Bush Administration, whatever that maybe - will take things into the positive direction, if the current Administration cannot.

Complimentaring StrategyUnit’s post on the Russia-Ukraine Gas sega, StratFor’s Peter Zeihan has an interesting perspective on the possible role and orientation of Dimitri Mendevev, Putin’s newly selected Prime Minister, and his in the Ukraine-Russian Gas issue.

StratFor’s article is interesting because it takes account to the role of Mendevev, whereas Jamestown Foundation, Eurasianet et al have been more focused on Putin or Russia itself.

So, who is this Medvedev?

In mid-November, Russian President Vladimir Putin named Dmitry Medvedev as first deputy prime minister. Medvedev is a rather rare personality in Russian politics, in that he is a modernizer who has not become unrealistically optimistic about Russia ever looking like — much less joining — the West, and a nationalist who has not fallen prey to the debilitating paranoia that often characterizes Russian policy. He also happens to be Putin’s protégé and the board chairman of Gazprom. The Ukraine natural gas crisis was his first Russian foreign-policy initiative.

Medvedev, like all Russians, recognizes that his country’s long-term prospects without Ukraine are, at best, bleak. That means that Russia’s European relations have become of secondary importance — they are no longer an end in their own right, but rather a means to other ends.

According to Stratfor, Medvedev’s motivations are similar to what was mentioned in StrategyUnit’s article: a method to reassert Russia on the world stage, taking advantage of the G-8 chairmanship to set the tone of its chairmanship. In this case it is to force Europe to consider Russia’s interests, power and importance seriously.

Prior to the Jan. 1 shutoff, the Europeans had become complacent, unappreciative of the scope of their dependency upon Russia or how much they have taken a “friendly” Moscow for granted since the end — or even before the end — of the Cold War. Energy supplies to Europe continued throughout the Afghan war, the 1983 war scare, the Moscow Olympic boycott, the putsch against Gorbachev, the Soviet breakup, the Chechen war, the Kosovo war, and the enlargements of NATO and the EU. The Europeans grew confident that as far as energy supplies were concerned, the Russians — while unpredictable in their rhetoric — were rock-solid in their reliability.

Medvedev’s primary goal was to redefine European perceptions of Russia. As of Dec. 31, Western Europeans perceived Russia primarily as an easily dismissed, benign former foe. But with the Gazprom cutoff — which diminished gas supplies needed for heating in the middle of winter — Russia proved itself not only sufficiently erratic to be taken seriously, but also capable of inflicting very real pain with a modicum of effort.

Now, did the Russians want to hurt the Europeans? Of course not. Europe, particularly “old” Europe, remains a potential partner for Moscow, and there is no reason for the Kremlin to introduce spite into an already complex relationship. But did the Russians want the Europeans to know that the Kremlin has the capacity and chutzpah to turn the screws? Absolutely. And doing so at a time of year when the wind whipping off the North Sea is anything but balmy adds that ever-incisive Russian touch.

This is not about establishing trust, but about establishing in Europe a respect for Russia’s strengths and an awareness of Russia’s concerns.
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The elegance of Medvedev’s strategy lies in the fact that simply causing the Europeans to think about Russian interests means that the Kremlin has driven a wedge not only between the Europeans and the Ukrainians, but between the Europeans and the Americans. If Russia is to recover what it has lost in geopolitical stature these past 15 years, this is precisely the sort of policy that will give it a fighting chance.

The entire article has more details regarding Ukraine’s motivations and calculations as well as its historic importance to Russia. Most interestingly it points to Yushchenko potential use of the gas issue as a way to play the “anti-Russian” card to boost his popularity for the upcoming March parliamentary elections.

If someone would like to see the article, please let me know and I can forward it. I am unsure if its available freely online.

Updated December 03, 2006
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Introduction

With the breakdown in price negotiations during recent days, Russian state-owned Gazprom choose to cut the gas deliveries to Ukraine, the main conduit for exports to the rest of Europe. This is a critical situation because, as mentioned by Bloomberg, “State-run Gazprom supplies about a quarter of gas consumed in Europe and ships about 75 percent of that volume through Ukrainian pipelines.”

Washington Post provides further details on the outcome: “On Sunday, with no agreement on a new price, Russia cut by 120 million cubic meters a day the volume of gas it sent down the Ukrainian pipeline — Ukraine’s share. But there were soon reports that the volume of gas reaching Austria, Italy, France, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Croatia at the other end had fallen by as much as 40 percent.

Gazprom claimed that Ukraine was stealing gas — about $25 million worth on Sunday alone, according to Alexander Medvedev, Gazprom’s deputy chairman”

Russian Climbdown

But only one day after cutting the gas supply, Russia has been forced to restore the supply with mounting criticism from Europe and US on Russia’s ability to be a reliable energy partner. Gazprom, however, tried to square all blame on Ukraine:

“With the aim of preventing a possible energy crisis caused by Ukraine illegally taking gas, Gazprom has taken the decision to deliver additional gas into the gas transport system of Ukraine,” the company said in a statement.

“We stress that the additional delivery of gas is not designed for Ukrainian consumers but is meant for transit through the territory of Ukraine for delivery to consumers outside the borders of Ukraine.”

Europe, IEA and the US are placing blame on Russia for the current crisis, demonstrating the limits of Russia’s “Petro-Power”.

Russian Stabs Itself and Stumbles

In the long term, Ukraine will have to come to a compromise with Russia leading to higher prices. But more substantially, Russia’s heavy handed tactics against Ukraine will backfire throughout Europe and Russia’s energy customers. What Russia has seeming underestimated is the reaction from Europe because of its actions against Ukraine. What Russia’s hardball tactics has done for Europe is to:

1. Highlight Europe’s dangerous energy dependency on an increasingly authoritarian Russia
2. Confirm the fear that Russia will turn to its energy resources as its main leverage of power in the global stage
3. Encourage European states to find alternative energy sources, away from Russia (Neighboring Finland is already building its first nuclear to move away from Russia)
4. Highlight that Putin and Russia cannot be trusted in other important issues like Iran, North Korea et cetera
5. Encourage speeding the process to include Ukraine in western institutions like NATO and the EU
6. Underline that the Russian-German gas pipeline (expected to be completed by 2010) is a naked attempt by Russia to consolidate its power and influence in Europe
7. Seals Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder image as sell-out for Moscow, as he is now working on Gazprom’s Russian-German Gas Pipeline
8. Draw increasing criticism to Russia for its increasing authoritarian use of power, such as the banning of NGOs, that will only grow as Russia assumes head of the G-8 this year.
9. Increase calls for Russia to be removed from the G-8 for not being a major world economy, a democracy or even a free-market state

This arrogant move against Ukraine amid recent criticism for restricting NGOs and holding the G-8 chair may be a signal that Putin’s consolidation of power is leading Russia to a belligerent authoritarian state, rather than a corporatist Russia (think Singapore) that can help consolidate Moscow’s power before Russia deteriorates and bring Russia back economically.

Conclusion
Ukraine and Russia are still a long way from resolving the issue, but so far we can conclude that even if Russia gets what it wants from Ukraine, it still come out loser on the world stage and its reputation as reliable energy partner is soiled. At this point in the situation, it is difficult to see how Russia stands to benefit against Ukraine and the world stage. The loss in international standing is costing a lot more than any possible gain from Ukraine.

Post-Script: A Contrarian View, Russia Exerts Power?
To keep the analysis balanced (since events are too early to call), Putin could be purposely timing the move against Ukraine because of its G-8 chairmanship.

It is possible that Putin wants to demonstrate that Russia is willing to flex its economic muscle regardless of its cost to the world stage and that in the face of an increasingly energy vulnerable Europe, Russia’s power is very much real. True, states like Finland are increasingly promoting nuclear energy as an alternative, but they take years to build and Russia has the largest natural gas reserve while Norway and the UK’s has dwindled.

In short, this event could be a move to show that Russia is not to be taken for granted as the world “natural gas tank station” to be tapped freely by Europe or its other customers. Raw/Single commodity export states are viewed somewhat disparging as backward states for advanced states to exploit - this is something that obviously Putin would not like Russia labeled as.

However, such increase in fear and power would only be a short/medium term gain. In the long run, such hardballing tactics would likely motivate Europe to move away from Russia - be it using nuclear power or alternative sources of natural gas. Thus, this is a risky gamble for Russia to make, if indeed this is Putin’s intentions.
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Howdy All Y’All…Happy Thanksgiving Day.

Here’s quick Weekend Reading…just in case you need a break from all that turkey and gravy. By the way, I’ve been doing some light posting this past two weeks, but I’ll start going back to the normal beat of things soon.

OxBlog on Jame’s Fellow’s “Why Iraq Has No Army” in December’s Atlantic Monthly

David Adensik does an analysis of James Fallows’ cover story in the Atlantic monthly “Why Iraq Has No Army”. The article has caused such a buzz that even “George Stephanopoulous attempted to use the article to cross-examine Donald Rumsfeld on Sunday morning.”

I agree with David Adesnik that despite the hype of a title, Fallows doesnt really say anything new nor goes into depth about anything groundbreaking. Adesnik also the lack of definately strong position in the article (from critical/pessimistic to hawkish) as reflective of the overall difficult position of the Democrats:

“So is there a third way that will allow Democrats to both criticize the war and be seen as hawkish? Yes there is. They can click their heels three times and say “I agree with John McCain.”"

The article is available for subscribers only, but if you would like a copy let me know and I can email it over. And, dont forget your local library (via online database) may carry a copy.

Oil Drum’s “There’s A New Kid In Town — Iran Versus Kazakhstan”

I’ve done an extensive research on Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and energy resources as part of my thesis in college, so its interesting (but not too surprising) to see Oil Drum’s “There’s A New Kid In Town — Iran Versus Kazakhstan” - which boldy proclaims the growing importance of Kazakhstan OVER Iran on energy resources:

Iran is still a giant and Kazakhstan is a middle tier country among the world’s oil suppliers. Iran produced 4081/kbd in 2004, 5.2% of the world’s total while Kazakhstan produced 1295/kbd, a paltry 1.6% percent of the whole. Iran has 132.5 billon barrels in proven reserves, 11.1% of the world’s total while Kazakhstan has 39.6 billion barrels, a 3.3% world share. But let’s look into our chrystal ball to see what the future may look like.
…
Around the years 2008 to 2009 period, Kazakhstan is exporting more total oil supply to the OECD countries, China and (perhaps) India than Iran is (Empahsis mine)

Eurasianet’s “China joins the Central Asian Base Race”

Stephen Blank of Eurasianet writes on China’s recent move to secure a military base in Kyrgyzstan and even in Uzbekistan, which the US has recently been kicked out from.

While Blank focuses on Chinese miltiary presence on Central Asia, we should not forget the joint Chinese-Pakistan naval base in Gwadar, Pakistan.

Beijing’s search for a base has occurred against a backdrop of growing regional militarization and an intensification of great power rivalry in Central Asia. Thus, China’s requests of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, even if made sotto voce, have served to heighten the geopolitical jockeying in the region. It also suggests a growing willingness entertain the use of the military instrument to address regional issues. This cannot be considered a good sign.

While SCO (which includes Russia, China all all major Central Asian states) asked for the US militray to leave Central Asia, Blank correctly points out that Russia come out more strongly against a Chinese over a US presence in Central Asia.

In the UK: “Gas industry on brink of winter crisis”

The OilDrum and EnergyBulletin have been covering the less known natural gas issues that faces the US, UK and others, but here’s a mainstream news on UK’s winter energy crisis:

The country’s gas industry is on a knife edge this winter and could tip into crisis if there is a major breakdown in its ageing North Sea fields and pipelines, analysts said on Thursday.

Europe’s biggest consumer is fast running out of gas from the fields that once made it self sufficient and kept prices among the lowest in Europe. Today, UK gas is the world’s costliest fuel and winter supply will be the tightest in memory.Government ministers are under pressure to explain how one of the world’s richest nations has left its energy policy hostage to the weather and ageing North Sea equipment.

Weekend Reading on the Cossack Revival

Since the fall fo the Soviet Union and more prominently under President Putin, there has been a great revival (See Radio Free Europe’s Piece) of the Cossack culture and increasing political clout including a movement to reassert their role as a security/military instrument of the state. And already it seems like they are back to performing ethnic cleansing duties in Russia.

Why is Putin using an old Imperial Russia approach to solving his country’s ills? Or is enigmatic Russia to be held by a different standard?

• From MosNews, “Russian Parliament Approves Law on Cossack Service“, 11/09/05
• From WaPo, “Revival of Cossacks Casts Muslim Group Out of Russia to U.S.“, 11/18/05
• From the RFE, “Russia: Moscow Opposes Don Cossacks’ Demand For ‘Own’ Oblast“, 11/08/05

Just last week, a bill pushed by President Putin was approved by the Duma approving for essentially the reinstating of the Cossack military role in the Russian State:

“According to the bill, Cossacks are to be sent for military service, as a rule, to military units with traditional Cossack names, to border units and the Internal Troops. Cossacks can also participate in the military and patriotic upbringing of young people, preventing and handling the consequences of emergency situations and natural disasters, guarding the state border and combating terrorism”

And week later, the Washington Post reports on how this Cossack revival is already showing its ugly self in the role of Cossacks in “soft” ethnic cleansing:

Thousands of Muslims from a small ethnic group known as the Meskhetian Turks are fleeing this Black Sea region for the United States. The exodus is caused by what human rights groups call a campaign of persecution sanctioned by local authorities and spearheaded by the Cossacks, a Russian militia that fought for the czars and is being revived.

In the past year, just more than 5,000 Meskhetian Turks have resettled in the United States as refugees, and 4,400 have approval to immigrate, according to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Another 7,000 have filed applications that U.S. officials are reviewing.

Keep in mind that the Cossack has been pursuing for a greater role in the North Caucasus - where troubled Chechnya lies and the place of the “Nalchik Raid“. If armed Cossack were brought to the North Caucasus, this would escalate an already deteriorating situation. Russia needs a holistic socio-economic, political and military solution to the Caucasus region, not the brute force of the Cossacks.

Meanwhile the Don Cossacks are trying to reassert themselves by pushing for recognition of their own oblast (province). They are trying to take advantage of Putin’s initiative to reduce the number of oblast in Russia, currently over 80 to a more manageable 20-30 oblast.

The Russian authorities will formally reject any request by the leaders of the State Register Don Cossacks to recreate the Don Cossack Oblast that existed a century ago by merging the present-day Rostov and Volgograd oblasts, “Nezavisimaya gazeta” reported on 3 November.

In the 16th century, Cossack settlers founded the republic of the Don Cossacks on the steppes along the lower and middle course of the Don River.

A spokesman for the Don Cossacks, Vladimir Ryabov, told that paper that the Don Cossacks intend to hold a referendum next year on merging the two regions. He also said that the Cossacks will revive their demand, first raised in the early 1990s, for the Cossacks to be given the status of a distinct ethnic group within Russia.

Summary
In November 10, General John Abizaid, Chief of U.S. Central Command visted Kazakhstan (America’s best friend) and stated that US presence in Central Asia is in no way part of “a repeat of great games of the 18th and 19th centuries”.

Indeed, he is right, this is definately not Arthur Conolly’s “Great Game”. In the latest alliance shift between the US, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were just as active in the game as were the major players (China, Russia and the US). And specifically for the US, its hand is rather weak to play such a game.

Indeed, the West should stop its obsession in painting the situation in Central Asia as some Great Game with the Central Asian states as pawns played by China, Russia and the US. The situation is more complicated with the US in a weak position and the Central Asian states are by no means passive.

First Uzbekistan drops the US and finds a new friend in Russia…
Not too long ago, Karimov’s Uzbekistan was the “bully” of Central Asia, out to make a name for itself as the hegemone. It’s the largest nation – more than half of Central Asia’s +50 million inhabitants live in Uzbekistan – and has the largest military force among the Central Asian states. Uzbekistan military has unilaterally mined along disputed borders and cut off gas supplies to neighbors during disputes.
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Jamestown Foundation’s Chechnya Weekly issue places the Nalchik Raid and the greater conflict in the Caucasus in Russia’s past imperial history. For anyone familiar with Russian history, this is not exactly news, but it helps bring some barring that Chechnya Conflict in and the Nalchik Raid is nothing new and should be expected.

Here’s what Jamestown’s Andrei Smirnov has to say:

The current Chechen policy of mobilizing other Caucasian nations in the struggle against Russia is not new. The Chechens have always tried to use this strategy to weaken the Russian offensive on Chechnya and strengthen their own forces.

In 1785, Sheikh Mansur, the leader of the first organized rebellion of the Chechens against Russian domination in the region, marched with his forces to Kabarda to persuade the locals to join him and spread the anti-Russian revolt to the western part of the North Caucasus. [This largely failed]

[Smirnov goes on to mention another attempted upraising in 1846 by Imam Shamil]
…
[Contemporary] Chechen commanders did not send squadrons of Chechen militants to other regions, but instead welcomed volunteers who wanted to help the Chechens fight against Russian troops.
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Now, there is no longer any need for Basaev to deploy Chechen groups to attack outside of Chechnya. He can go individually to any of the neighboring republics and recruit as many local men as needed to conduct a large-scale operation. This ensures that Basaev does not have to divert his Chechen forces, which immobilize the best-trained Russian troops and who are stuck in a quagmire of endless guerilla war. The new tactic allows the insurgency to open new fronts without weakening their struggle in Chechnya itself. This is the worst scenario the Russian authorities could imagine.

Conclusion
The Importance of Historical Context
This first lesson from this article is that while Islamic terrorism of the Salafist/Wahhabi/Global Guerilla kind is new, the conflicts in Chechnya and the Caucasus are not. The Caucasus has always resisted Russian rule – whether it be an imperial, soviet or other incarnation of Russia. Indeed before Russia, Chechnya was busy resisting the Ottoman Turks. Thus even without the radical Islam element, we would expect some conflict against Russian rule.

Amy Chua in “World on Fire” argues that sudden transition to free-market democracy can spark ethnic hatred - she cite’s the ethnic riots againt the Chinese in Indonesia after Suharto’s fall. While she’s speaking of a very specific case, the greater macro level analysis is the renewing and eruption of ethnic hatred once the stability of the old and iron-fisted regime is gone. For Indonesia it was Suharto and for Russia it was the fall of USSR.

True there were Chechen revolts under the USSR, but back then the Soviets could act with ruthless abandon (mass deportation) - today, this has changed with a Russia constrained by new international norms and weakened by its deteriorating state.

From Chechen Upraising to Global Guerillas
As mentioned by Smirnov, compared to centuries past, the structure of the Caucasus insurgency has changed from mainly Chechen based forces to Chechen-led forces with volunteers from throughout the Caucasus region.

From there, it isn’t much a leap to begin to see leaders beyond Basaev and Chechens, bringing forth a fully decentralized insurgency. Without a doubt, John Robb’s Bazaar of Violence will appear in Russia in full form, if it hasn’t already.

Attempting to find a political solution in Chechnya was complex enough, doing the same from the entire Caucasus may prove impossible.

Related StrategyUnit Links:
- Guerilla War in Kabardino-Balkaria , Another Chechnya Erupts
- Green Revolution in Russia - Part II
- Nalchik Raid- Russian Civil War in the Caucasus

Still on light posting mode…but I think this should be noted in contrast to the Oil Drum’s recent discussion I noted on Saudi Oil.

From Reuters:

Russian oil output could peak at more than 510 million tonnes annually in 2010, or 10.2 million barrels per day (bpd), Russian Energy Minister Victor Khristenko said on Monday.

“It will reach a certain plateau of production within the time frame of 2010,” Khristenko told reporters. That plateau would be about 510 to 520 million tonnes a year, he said, or the equivalent of about 10.2 to 10.4 million bpd. In September, Russia produced 9.53 million bpd, which was a post-Soviet high, according to Energy Ministry data.

And let’s not forget that Russia currently is neck-and-neck with the Saudi’s on oil production:

Russia is chasing Saudi Arabia’s title as the world’s top crude oil producer. Saudi Arabia pumped 9.6 million bpd of crude oil in September, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.

But unlike the Middle East’s oil giant, which chooses not to pump at full capacity, Russia is keen to see production hit record highs. Saudi Arabia has surplus capacity of up to 1.4 million bpd, according to the EIA.

More oil worries to ponder on.

I was just about to follow-up on my previous Russia and Eurasia post when CS Monitor (CSM) today published “Russia, China looking to form ‘NATO of the East’?” and opens with this foreboding paragraph:

Russia and China could take a step closer to forming a Eurasian military confederacy to rival NATO at a Moscow meeting of the six-member Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Wednesday, experts say.

(Source: Wikipedia. Blue = Member, Green = Observer)

Pretty scary stuff, eh? Its an enticing leading paragraph, but the truth is a little milder.

Brief History of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
The Shanghai Five, as it was originally called, was originally comprised of China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and founded in 1996; it was later renamed the Shanghai Co-operation Organization, when Uzbekistan joined in 1999. Originally established to counter Islamic terrorist threats located in the Western China and its neighboring countries, SCO has increasingly become a vehicle to:

• further China’s quest for securing oil resources;
• enhance its role as a major player in regional security;
• and, to a lesser extant, as a united Sino-Russian bloc against growing U.S. presence in the region.

(From an old paper of mine)
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Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Monitor and RFE/RL has a good roundup of the Nalchik raid. All of them supporting StrategyPage’s position of another guerilla war coming to Russia

Key quote from a Russian legislator:

“It was more like a mutiny, an attempt to seize power in the city, and we should label it properly.” Ilyukhin added that the Russian security agencies cannot guarantee that there won’t be a repetition of the Nalchik events somewhere else in the North Caucasus and that the situation in the region, in his opinion, has no military solution.

From the Duma Security Committee member Viktor Ilyukhi, after meeting with the Interior Minister, the Director of the FSB and others on Nalchik
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 9, No. 198, Part I, 20 October 2005)

Jamestown’s round-up confirms that Nalchik is part of a wider guerilla war, albeit still in its early stages, at least for Kabarindo-Balkaria:

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This is continuing with yesterday’s post “Great Game Revisited (again) and the Green Revolution“.

On the Caucasus
Any attention the U.S. press pays attention to the southern Russia is only limited to Afghanistan and more to Central Asia, with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgystan. But not enough attention is paid to the deteriorating situation in the Caucasus and the dangerous consequences that it may represent.

As I’ve written in a recent post, the scale (over 200+), composition (local) and targets (security installations) of the Nalchik Raid in southern Russia represents a huge blow to Russia’s control over its troubled Caucasus region, which includes Chechnya. Indeed, while Putin and the Russian elites fret over the Color Revolution (Orange, Tulip, Rose) that has reverberated throughout the former Soviet Space, a Green Revolution is increasingly destabilize southern Russia thanks partly to Russia’s own ineptness:

Accepting that post-Soviet revolutions are not organized from outside but driven by public anger against corrupt authoritarian regimes is all but impossible for Putin and his courtiers. It would inevitably lead to the conclusion that the street battles in Nalchik were not a terrorist attack but an outburst of accumulated rage caused by police brutality and officially sanctioned persecution of Muslims (Vremya novostei, October 14). (Jamestown Foundation, emphasis mine)

Drawing from the Nalchik Raid, Andrei Smirnov at Jamestown gravely stated regarding the state of security in the Caucasus:

The Nalchik attack showed that the rebels in the North Caucasus maintain sufficient military capabilities to attack and temporarily hold one of the largest cities in the North Caucasus and could have enough capability to seize control of a whole region in the near future. The attack on Nalchik sent a clear warning to Putin and his team that they are outgunned in the Caucasus. (Jamestown Foundation, empahsis mine)

To add to that, the Nalchik Raid demonstrates that the Islamofacist have the intiative. They can choose when and where to attack, putting the Russian security forces on the defensive.

The Kremlin and the local governments inaptness in the Caucasus combined with the situation in Chechnya Conflict risk spilling an arc of fire across the region - where the vacuum of Russian power and legitimacy would lead to the raise and spread of radical Islam, as a significant movement.

Once reaching a sizable movement any turn to suppress them violent by Russian forces would be seen, not only as harsh and repressive, but also taking on the same tinge of apartheid and ethnic cleansing. That would be the tipping point, where the Caucasus would be lost to everything, but the radical extremist.

It would lead to the creation of a region far worse than Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, closer to Russia (obviously), closer to Europe and closer to the enormous energy resources and pipeline infrastructure in the region and in close-by Central Asia.

Central Asia and the Caucasus share the pecular trait of being important geopolitical points, yet so little understood or cared about in the mainstream media. To do my part in remedying that, I’d like to point out to a great article on Central Asia (which more often gets some U.S. media coverage) and contrast that with recent events in the Caucasus (which rarely ever does).

On Central Asia
Tech Central Station has a new article by Ariel Cohen, of the Heritage Foundation, featuring the (tired) title “The Great Game Returns“, where he covers Condoleeza Rice’s imporant trip throughout Central Asia.

Central Asia is the important flash point for the United States, China and Russia (its former imperial power) for several reasons:

• Most hot on everyone’s mind is the resurgence of Islam and the threat of radicalization - of a reason known to embrace sufism and a distinct school of Islam
• Central Asia, while landlocked, has a enormous amount of natural gas resource and a good amount of oil. Kazakhstan alone is set on an ambitious path to exceed the production of the North Sea

Key points from Ariel Cohen:

[On the Purpose of the Condi Rice Trip]
The visit demonstrated Sec. Rice’s balancing act skills. On the one hand, she needs to propel further President Bush’s democratization agenda. But on the other, just like in the Middle East, the imperatives of the war on terrorism and U.S. energy security dictate a more Realpolitik approach.

The stakes are high. Afghanistan and Central Asia are where the rubber of President Bush’s democratization doctrine meets the rocky road of authoritarianism. What’s more, Central Asia is important as a major source of oil and gas. By 2015, the Caspian Sea basin, including Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, will produce four million barrels a day — more than Kuwait and Iraq today combined. The region is also surrounded by the emerging giants, energy-starved India and China, and bordered by key Islamist states Iran and Pakistan.

[On the challenge from Russia and China]
In August SCO sent a strong message to its Central Asian members when they conducted unprecedented joint military maneuvers in the Far East. The new de-facto Moscow-Beijing bloc is aimed at U.S. “hegemony” as well as to American rhetoric of democracy.

In the meantime, Islamist radicals are spreading their tentacles in the impoverished and drug-ridden villages and slums of the region. Hizb ut-Tahrir, a global Sunni clandestine organization which aims to overthrow secular regimes and create a Califate, has made Uzbekistan its primary target. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is allied with Al Qaeda and active in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s border areas.

[Reason for the Special Rice Visit to Kazakhstan]
…
Kazakhstan may be a key to U.S. interests in the region. As Nazarbaev announced in his September speech to the parliament, in ten years his country may surpass Kuwait and Nigeria as an oil exporter, pumping over 2.5 million barrels a day.
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One hopes that Sec. Rice also encouraged Mr. Nazarbaev to finally authorize construction of a pipeline connecting Kazakh oil fields to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline which takes Caspian oil to the Mediterranean and global markets.

She could also praise and encouraged Kazakhstan to promote its unique model of peace and harmony among Muslims, Christians and Jews around the Islamic world. Finally, she could encourage Kazakhstan to sponsor the U.S. gaining observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, so that Washington can alleviate Beijing and Moscow’s fears as to its intentions in the heartland of Eurasia while continue playing an important role there.

I think its a great summary, but on Kazakhstan, I ‘d like to add one more thing to place Kazakhstan’s relationship with the U.S. in greater context: President Nazarbayev has almost alwaysed followed a multi-vectored foreign policy, trying to balance all the major powers in the region:

• Nazarbayev has sought good terms with Russia, its larger and power neighbor in the north and also the original homeland for a sizeable number of Russians in Kazakhstan
• At the same time, Nazarbayev has reached out to China. This year China and Kazakhstan completed the creation of a major pipeline expected to deliver a million bbl of oil per day to China. Before the Sino-Kazakh pipeline, Kazakhstan was wholely dependent on Russia for export of its oil. They are also looking to export Kazakhstan’s natural gas through China.

With Kazakhstan already playing well with Russia and China, naturally Kazakhstan needs to pay attention to the other player in Central Asia: the United States. Especially with the lost of Uzbekistan as a partner in Central Asia, U.S. is in dire need of finding other partners - although Kazakhstan would probably never reach the level of military cooperation with the U.S. that Uzbekistan once did.

And with all this in mind, we move on to the Caucaus…

On the Caucasus
Check back tomorrow…

Introduction

Last week, we see yet another violent manifestation of Russia as a deteriorating state in the Nalchik Raid; Nalchik is the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, about 870 miles south of Moscow. Unlike in Beslan or the Moscow Threatre, this time it was a large force of 300 fighters concentrating their attack police stations and other government and security related facilities

As I wrote on “Eurasia” earlier, the Southern front was Russia’s soft underbelly with a growing EU/NATO in the Western front and a raising East in the Eastern Front (see map below). Proponents of the “Clash of Civilizations” would say this is another case of Islam’s bloody borders. This are unfortunately more complicated.

As reported by WSJ, “officials in Nalchik said almost all the rebels were from Kabardino-Balkaria.” The attacks were on symbols and instruments of state authority: the “three police stations, the headquarters of the local FSB (the former KGB), the interior ministry building, the offices of the city’s prison guards, a military unit guarding the airport and a counter-terrorism centre.” (link.)
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Ben Paarmann recently posted an excellent overview of the Eurasian Idea (specifically Dugin’s version) and its role in Russia today. I’d like to take Paarmann’s post further and provide some greater context for the Eurasian Idea, why its still important for Russia today, the different Eurasian flavors and attempt to provide points about where Russia must go. (Ambitious, I know!)

Eurasian Idea in Greater Context
The question “What is Russia?” is a question that continues to shadow Russia and its long history. Russia cannot continue to leave this question unanswered while it attempts to rebuild itself from its Soviet-past and as the state continues to deteriorate. Putin, as Paarmann mentions, has so far taken a pragmatic approach towards the East and West
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