StrategyUnit

Introduction
A few months back, I wrote in “India, the US and the Anglosphere“, that India should be positioned by the US as the next global leader “just as Great Britain gracefully passed its world power status to the United States, the United States must look to do them same with India or else face decline in the face of a raising China”.

The New York Times op-ed, “The Myth of the New India” placed forward many criticism of such a promise for India, such as stating “Recent accounts of the alleged rise of India barely mention the fact that the country’s $728 per capita gross domestic product is just slightly higher than that of sub-Saharan Africa”. Indeed, the July 11th’s Mumbai bombings is a tragic reminder of the instability and security risks facing India.

Admitedly, India is not as glowing as some articles on the July/August edition of Foreign Affairs claim (indeed, some of the articles read like well crafted press releases). And while it does face many challenges in poverty and socio-economic issues, the much talked about “The Myth of the New India” NYT articles ignores three main points: 1) the large progress India has made thus far; 2) how much potential it has already shown; 3) and how much India’s political weight is growing - all this despite the economic underdevelopment that persist through most of India.

India: Not Quite Half Empty

Pankaj Mishra, who wrote “The Myth of the New India”, astutely points to several critical areas that has still dodge India despite its high-tech boom:

• Wealth Distribution - especially in Urban versus Rural (70% of India) populations
• Extensive and Deep Poverty - “nearly 380 million Indians still live on less than a dollar a day”
• Political Instability - Kashmir Issue, Religious Militants and a growing Communist Insurgency

Mishra is correct that these issues are a tremendous obstacle to the great power ambitions many increasingly confident Indians are voicing. There are other issues too, like India’s inefficient bureaucracy and its social economic system, which is considered unfriendly towards the type of more open market that is thought needed for high sustained growth.

Yet somewhere between the hope and ambition for India to become a great power and Mishra’s dire warnings, lies progress and great hope for India. Indeed, we should keep in mind that the progress it has made, in the high-tech and financial industry, despite such underdevelopment is impressive and no small feat.

Keeping Things Within Balance

While socio-economic development should ideally be uniform throughout a nation, it is often not. Issues like Rural v. Urban populations and continuing dire poverty in the face of a small, but growing, wealthy elite are real, but common problems faced buy many developing nations and characterize the struggles of many now developed Western nations.

For example, China is facing similar issues, especially as life-time employment at public factories makes way for layoffs and semi-private ownership. And the Urban versus Rural gap is evident in China, as it is in Paris compared to the surrounding banlieue and America’s urban centers in the coasts with the rural areas in the South.

Geopolitical Considerations

Mishra contends that India will not be considered a loyal ally that the United States hopes for as long as it continues making pragmatic deals with China and Iran. This maybe true, but to take this situation on a different view: Perhaps, India will show that constructive engagement between India and countries like Iran and like China are possible. To be sure, Containment is a valid strategy, but the US needs to be reminded that so is Engagement.

Myth and Promise

The essence of Mishra’s article is this: “Many serious problems confront India. They are unlikely to be solved as long as the wealthy, both inside and outside the country, choose to believe their own complacent myths.”

This is no doubt true. India’s growing elite must be confident, but never arrogant nor ignorant of the tremendous challenges that are clearly ahead of it.

India’s growing high-tech industry demonstrating that India is capable in developing their vast potential, not that they have already acheived it. Indeed, being part of one of the world’s oldest civilizations, Indians should know that the IT boom of the past 20 or so years, is not even a flicker in time.

But while Mishra’s article acts as a warning to those that forget the challenge, we should also take note of the following:

If a government like China’s, an oppressive authoritarian government, is beginning to address environmental concerns and wealth distribution with some postive action (see “China - Environmentalism as a National Security Issue”) - we should hope India, the world’s largest democracy, can do even better.

Summary: The Global Swarm Continues
StrategyUnit has focused on the fact that “Islamic Terrorism” (for lack of a better, shorter term) as it exists today is very much the global guerilla movement that John Robb has been writting about.

The recent arrests in Toronto, aborting a potential attacking, and a recent article by Michael Scheuer (author of Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War), reinforce the position that Islamic Terrorism is an organic, decentralized beast. Its bigger than Al-Qaida, bigger than Bin Laden and bigger than the now deceased al-Zarqawi. Al-Qaida does have an important role, but as the instigator, the proclaimed vanguard, of a wider Islamist social movement.

Indeed, as StrategyUnit has noted: “As this war is more of cross between an insurgency and a social movement, there maybe no clean cessation of violence in the near or distant future. And in this conflict, there will be no battlefields, but rather our adversaries will be attached as a Global Swarm as Global Guerillas.”

The Toronto 17
The 17 potential terrorists arrested in Tortonto has direct connections to Al-Qaida and were, like the July 7 Londong bombers, homegrown groups. While the details are coming out, the Internet played a major role in communication, indoctrination (recruitment) and training (bombing making).

The suspected terrorists were, luckily for us, inept. A group of “foreign looking” men doing weapons training in the open and later buying three tons of fertilizers (not a fact easy to hide) are not the hallmarks of terrorist masterminds.

Bin Laden - Status: Success or Failure

Michael Scheuer, author of Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War, notes that many experts have written off Bin Laden as a failure:

Over the past two years, U.S. and Western commentators have concluded that Osama bin Laden is largely irrelevant as the leader of the worldwide Sunni insurgency. Newsweek’s Fareed Zakaria, for example, has said that “by now it is surely clear that al-Qaeda can produce videotapes but not terrorism…And the bad guys are losing” (Newsweek, March 15, 2004). James S. Dobbins at the National Review added that bin Laden “made many threats of course, but was never able to back them up, creating an unbridgeable credibility gap” (National Review Online, September 28, 2005). The new CIA chief, General Michael Hayden, has described bin Laden’s recent audiotapes as a public relations campaign to prove he is still alive. “These attempts,” Hayden said, “may be an attempt on their part [bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri] to kind of re-establish authenticity with their followers” (AP, February 5). Finally, from Sarah Lawrence College, Fawaz Gerges all but dismisses bin Laden’s relevance, arguing that “we are in the throes of the beginning of a new wave [in the Muslim world]–the freedom generation–in which civil society is asserting itself” (Christian Science Monitor, February 4, 2004). In short, these arguments assert that the situation has improved.

But indeed, this is not the case. Scheuer correctly points out that Bin Laden, sees himself and Al-Qaida as the final means, but the “match” to light the Ummah (Islamic World) on fire, motivating it against the West:

“[Bin Laden] has never claimed that al-Qaeda could achieve this goal by itself. Quite the contrary, he has consistently maintained that al-Qaeda is only the vanguard of the large-scale movement that is needed to achieve this goal.”

The recruitment of Europeans to fight in Iraq, the Madrid and London Bombings, the abortive attempt in Toronto, the recent alliance of “”Islamist leaders in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, Jordan and Jerusalem” all point to the face that the “flame” is alive and thriving.

Conclusion
The recent Toronto arrests shows that the threat is still very real and is far more diverse than a threat “from over there”, but it is a threat that can be as homegrown as meatloaf and apple pie (for you American readers).

Introduction

Noah Schachtman of DefenseTech is always a persistent source of great information regarding the technology and equipment that is used in today’s battlefields. (Via Op-For) In PopularSciences, Schachtman and David Axe write on “Winning—and Losing—the First Wired War“: “U.S. forces in Iraq are waging a pivotal campaign in modern warfare—combat on the first “networked” battlefield. One problem: the enemy has a few networks of its own ”

Schachtman and David Axe go to the heart of the issue in Iraq:

“But now, more than three years into sectarian conflict and a violent insurgency that has cost nearly 2,400 American lives, an investigation of the current state of network-centric warfare reveals that frontline troops have a critical need for networked gear—gear that hasn’t come yet. “There is a connectivity gap,” states a recent Army War College report. “Information is not reaching the lowest levels.”

This is a dangerous problem, because the insurgents are stitching together their own communications network. Using cellphones and e-mail accounts, these guerrillas rely on a loose web of connections rather than a top-down command structure. And they don’t fight in large groups that can be easily tracked by high-tech command posts. They have to be hunted down in dark neighborhoods, amid thousands of civilians, and taken out one by one.”

Net-centric Warfare v. Global Guerillas
Net-centric Warfare defined in a monograph at DODCCRP (same folks who published “Shock and Awe”):

“We define NCW as an information superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self- synchronization. In essence, NCW translates information superiority into combat power by effectively linking knowledgeable entities in the battlespace”

As Schachtman and Axe noted, NCW is layman’s term the “Walmart-ification” of warfare. (Indeed the monograph of the excerpt above, goes into great detail analyzing the logistical success of Wal-Mart and Dell and other corporations.) But what does NCW look like on the battlefield, Schachtman and Rose describes the following:

“The air-ground collaboration is one of dozens of different ways that network-centric tools are slowly starting to rejigger the military’s hidebound hierarchies. In the Gulf War, the various armed services didn’t talk to one another much, except at the highest levels. That’s partly why there was a six-week air campaign and then a ground attack. During the 2003 invasion, the air and ground assaults struck at once.”

But one of the most powerful tools in battalion command posts like these, notes Garstka, the network-centric theorist, may be one of the simplest: a Web browser, so junior officers can log into secure online forums. There captains and lieutenants can swap tactics, well before they appear in printed field manuals. This is critical in a place like Iraq, where insurgents’ strategies change almost daily. ”

With exception of advance weapon systems and resource intensive efforts like building a Carrier battle group, it is John Robb’s “Global Guerillas” which are best suited to adopting and adapting to technology. For more information on “Global Guerillas”, I strongly suggest reading John Robb’s “THE Bazaar of Violence in Iraq” and “THE Bazaar’s Open Source Platform “. It is required reading in my book.

The US Military and Global Guerillas are both fighting as net-centric agents, but the US Military is after all a hierarchal system, a tool of the nation-state and thus structurally it is slower to adapt. Meanwhile as decentralized and organic entities, “Global Guerillas” naturally evolve into ever more sophistication: the weaker insurgent groups get killed and captured, while the more successful groups sharing and help others replicate their success.

The advantage of the US military (or conventional militaries in general) is its ability to focus its resources into a certain direction in a more coordinated fashion, while the “Global Guerillas” can afford to use a slower trial-and-error method - attrition is not as much as a concern for them.

John Robb’s “Global Guerillas” will always be more nimble and faster that traditional nation-state militaries. The state and its military are by definition more slowly moving, more hierachial and more bound by policies and laws - then numble, adapting, loosely networked, nimble and Global Guerillas. Its not so much that the Global Guerillas are networking better than the US Military, its that the Global Guerillas can afford to adapt more quickly.

Net-Centric Warfare - Myopic Pipedreams
Setting aside the “Global Guerilla” issue, NCW has great limitations. When reading defense experts and their whitepapers/monographs on “Net-Centric Warfare” and “Effects-Based Operation”, we see terms phrases like “information dominance” and “complete situational awareness” and the like.

But the case-studies such war studies experts like to review - Amazon.com, Wal-Mart and Dell - are a world aware from an actual, fluid and “fog” ridden battlefield. There are collecting and analyzing information from a relatively static “battle space” so to speak.

Planning, preparing, executing and adjusting to the changing and fluid battle-space of fourth generation warfare is utterly different than keeping an excellent inventory over your retail logistics network – basically what the Wal-Mart, Dell and Amazon.com case studies are all about. It’s a joke to assume that future soldiers will be equipped with electronic devices to depend on a full host of communication and information share – where will the electricity come from? Are these devices anti-virus proof or even from protected from rough use?

The “Fog of War” will always be a factor that will be foolish to underestimate. Thus, the premise of complete “information dominance” and complete “situational awareness” is a false hope. Net-Centric Warfare is one of the new components of warfare, but it won’t be the last nor the only.

The Signs Pile Up
StratFor’s George Friedman writes in “Civil Liberties and National Security” (05.16.06):

“The release of the data-mining story to USA Today obviously was intended as a means of shooting down his nomination — which it might. But what is important here is not the fate of Hayden, but the fact that the Bush administration clearly has lost all control of the intelligence community — extended to include congressional oversight processes. That is not a trivial point.
…
Leaks of information about secret projects to a newspaper is a symptom of the disease: a complete collapse of any consensus as to what this war is, what it means, what it risks, what it will cost and what price Americans are not willing to pay for it. A covert war cannot be won without disciplined covert operations. That is no longer possible in this environment. A serious consensus on the rules is now a national security requirement.” (Emphasis Mine)

Last week on Thomas Barnett’s blog:

“Putin’s backtalking, along with Ahmadinejad’s and all the rest around the world, just signals the growing awareness internationally that the Bush Administration is a spent force. This crew is not inclined to change their spots now, and the world knows it.

So, quite frankly, our debates should focus most on who and what comes next for America. The conversation is basically over with the Bush Administration. So it’s time to focus on the new ideas, the new leaders, and the lifers within the bureaucracy who will both rule–for all practical purposes–in the meantime and be there when the new crew arrives.”(Emphasis Mine)

Comment
At a moment the US is facing many critical issues domestically (immigration to domestic intelligence) to challenging foreign policy issues (Iran, Iraq, to Latin America) and overarching issues regarding energy and the environment, the United States is quickly finding itself in a rut with a sitting-duck presidency. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration has lost control of any stern party leadership, control over its own agencies and department and directions on policies.

While the “sitting-duck presidency” is a sickness befalling just about every president on his/her last term, its only May, 2006. What happens six-months from now?

Bottom Line:
Will the security environment deteriorate vis-à-vis the US? What power plays will foreign adversaries, competitors and even some allies pursue against the US while we are in this state of flux?

In the coming months, we should expect to see interesting maneuverings from China, Russia, Venezuela, Iran – among others.

The Elections in the UK, Italy and soon in the US
UK: Last week’s regional elections has escalated a civil war in Blair’s Labour Party, with dissenters demanding him to step down. Telegraph reports: “Tony Blair abandoned his election promise to serve a full third term last night, indicating that he could stand down next summer.”

Italy: Prime Silvio Minsiter Berlusconi’s lost in April’s elections has paved the way for Romano Prodi to take lead as the succeeding Prime Minister. Prodi has discussed pulling out the 2,700 Italian troops (3rd largest contingent in Iraq). The latest targeting against Italian troops in Iraq will expedite such moves; indeed, CounterTerrorBlog discusses that Al-Qaida hopes to bully Italy to withdraawing, doing what it did against Spain with.

US: Mid-term elections are coming around very soon for the US, leaving many Republican nervous. With President Bush hitting every lower and lower approval ratings and increased Republican-infighting, we should expect Democrats to make gains against the Republicans. If they will recapture Congress is not known, but things can only get worse for the Republicans – and so the support for the Iraq War will suffer.

The Consequences
The fourth largest contingent of forces, from South Korea, are already beginning their partial pullout, paring down “1,000 of its 3,200 soldiers remaining in the country” by the end of this year. Italy, with the coming establishing of Prodi’s government, will most likely pull out its forces out of Iraq perhaps by the end of the year. The UK, American’s venerable ally, could be next when Prime Minister Tony Blair steps down. A very scary situation for supporters of the Iraq War.

With the “Coalition of the Willing” already mocked for its lack of many major powers, the list of nations (listed by the Coalition’s web site) will look even thinner.

Shakeup in the CIA, raising oil prices and the Iran Crisis are putting President Bush in an ever weaker position in the mainstream press and the masses (as the polls show). As more announcements on withdrawals will be announced, support of the war will fall into an ever deeper lull.

Still, the StrategyPage still looks pretty optimistic over the conditions in Iraq:

“[Violence] keeps the foreign journalists happy, but the local reporters are more concerned with the street crime and corrupt government officials…Most of the patrols and raids are now conducted by Iraqi troops, who are well aware of the fact that they are still fighting Saddam.”

But the overall feeling Americans and the world will have is “if the US is wining the war in Iraq, why is everyone pulling out? Abandoning the US?” The counterpoint that the more successful Iraqi government troops continue to be the more the Coalition Forces can step down will sound too convenient of an answer.

While the US has been and needs to slowly withdrawing some troops from Iraq as Iraqi Government forces standup, US withdrawal under media and public calls for an immediate pullout may only embolden and encourage the insurgents and US enemies.

While not perfect analogies, British troops remained in Malaysia for over 10 years to quell the Communist rebellion and similar numbers of years were spent by US forces in the 1899–1913 Philippine Insurrection (though with a high cost of civilian life). A better analogy is that Japan did not receive its sovereignty from the Allies until 1952.

We are only in Year 3 of the Post-Saddam Iraq Era. While the world and even the US public will increase pressure on withdrawing US forces, we need to remember that the Iraq Project is a long term project – longer than a single election cycle – and will have a profound effect on the Middle East, the World and most importantly the Iraqi People for generations to come. It is sad irony that elections in the democracies of the UK, Italy et al may imperil democracy in Iraq.

For a view supporting “Cut and Run” from Iraq, see Lt. Gen. William E. Odom’s article “ Cut and Run? You Bet” in Foreign Policy, May/June 2006.

Summary
In a move echoing Nixon’s trip to China, India and the US have announced a groundbreaking nuclear deal, which many have warned as “Nuclear Madness” helping to accelerate dangerous nuclear proliferation. “Unsettling” this thought is, the reality is that nuclear proliferation cannot be stopped, so the US must well to play the nuclear card when it can. The hope is that this deal is the beginning of growing closer ties between the two world’s leading and largest democracies, which includes the recognition of a new Core power into the fold of the Core states.

The great challenge is for the Post-Bush Administration to carry on with increasing US ties with India for the Bush Administration and the one after to resist temptations to make India a bulwark against China. India is too confident, important and practical to be a pawn for the US; hopefully, the US will not only recognize that, but can see India as a way for bringing more stability to the South Asia and its neighboring region and expanding the Core. India should not play any role in competing against China, but rather help bring China in to the Core as a responsible and productive partner.

Click here for further analysis including sections on:
- Nuclear Fears
- Risking Nuclear Issues for New Realities
- India and the Anglosphere? And What about China?

Related Past Postings:

(more…)

Via Volokh.com, the EU Justice and Security Commissioner has recently declared:

The European Union may try to draw up a media code of conduct to avoid a repeat of the furor caused by the publication across Europe of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad, an EU commissioner said on Thursday.

In an interview with Britain’s Daily Telegraph, EU Justice and Security Commissioner Franco Frattini said the charter would encourage the media to show “prudence” when covering religion.

“The press will give the Muslim world the message: We are aware of the consequences of exercising the right of free expression,” he told the newspaper. “We can and we are ready to self-regulate that right.” (Empahsis Mine)

In StrategyUnit’s commentary on the Jyllands-Posten Muhammed Cartoons, I stated:

The gulf and difference in values, assumptions and perception between millions of Muslims and what the West (esp. the sacredness of the freedom of speech) is not to be underestimated. This is a real division that exists between the cultures and a wedge that fundamentalist at both sides can drive and finally nail down to make the “Clash of Civlizations” a defacto truth.

Sadly, StrategyUnit has miscalculated the sense “sacredness” over free speech that EU officials are willing to state publicly. Eugene Volokh sums it up well, here:

When you say something like that against a backdrop of thugs burning embassies and killing people in reaction to your citizens’ speech, appeasement and surrender are exactly what’s going on, “voluntary” rules or not. Millions of Europeans should feel humiliated that one of their super-government’s officials is even proposing this.

Quick Post: Update on “Getting India Right : Recreating the Anglosphere”
The Economist Writes on US-India relations

The StrategyUnit has recently posted several articles relating to India, with the strongest being “Getting India Right : Recreating the Anglosphere“, where it is declared:

“There has been discussion that just as Great Britain gracefully passed its world power status to the United States, the United States must look to do the same with India or else face decline in the face of a raising China.”

Now the Economist (Feb 25), ahead of Bush’s March visit to India, leads with two articles highlighting the Bush Administration’s approach with India. The second article, “The Great India Hope Trick“, goes through the three major topics: 1) the difficulty surrounding the Bush Administration’s nuclear technology deal with India; and 2) the American temptation to see India as part of an anti-China axis partner; 3) while India needs and wants to be seen as an equal in any partnership with the US.
(more…)

Summary
Many commentators have discussed the possibility of the Six-Party Talks on North Korea - which consist of China, Japan, US, Russia and the two Koreas - as the future basis for a security forum for Northeast Asia. East Asia is an important and dynamic region with growing economies and equally growing security needs, yet formal mechanism exist for communication and dialogue among the major players.

While the need for a security forum is apparent to all players involved, the specific issue that should help bring a security forum into fruitarian is Energy Security. The need for energy security coordination in a region highly dependent on imported oil is well overdue.

Indeed, even in the OSCE, the current chairman has called for a conference for all OSCE members to discuss the need for better coordination on energy security matters. It is time for the even more imported energy dependent nations of Asia to do the same and much more.
(more…)

Down at the Winds of Change.net, the Armed Liberal and Trent Telenko have been discussing what to do with the Iranian situation. I have made my own comments at WoC, but I am repeating them here because I think laying out the choices in this manner really helps in providing constructive discussion on the Iranian Question.

Weighing the Concequences: Doing some Bombing v. Just Doing Nothing
Note that the “Doing Some Bombing” concequences are mostly short-term issues, while “Just Doing Nothing” are long term issues.

(more…)

Commentary
Jyllands-Posten Cartoons: Sparking a Clash of Civilizations

The Jyllands-Posten cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad have sparked a global culture clash being seen around the world. Brussels Journal has done an exemplery job covering this event as it unfolds and their article, “The War is On“, is among others a must read.

The implications on Islamic terror is profound, as the the Wretched has noted: “The holy grail of every agitator is to find an issue on which both sides are unalterably opposed. Radical Islam has found it the blasphemy of Mohammed and ironically gave those who would rouse the West a mirror issue of their own: the blasphemy of censorship and the extinction of freedom of speech.”

The Clash of Cultural: A Counterpoint

What is missing in the conservative blogosphere is any serious analysis about what is the perspective of the “other side”. In today’s Asia Times Online, Ehsan Ahrari presents us with this view. Aharai is a respected strategic analyst, former professor at Armed Forces Staff College and has written written numerous papers for the US Military’s Strategic Studies Institute. His views, though contrarian to many in the West, should be taken seriously.

Here are excerpts from Ahari’s “Cartoons and the clash of ‘freedoms’“:

What seems to be notably different about the era after the terror attacks in 2001 is that no subject, and nothing, is sacred in the West, especially when it comes to Muslims and Islam.
…
In Austria, it is against the law to make any statements denying the occurrence of the Holocaust. But one can say anything about Islam and get away with it. Aren’t Muslims right when they take the position that there is an open season against their religion, and that the exercise of freedom of expression is used only as a “civilized” excuse for insulting them?
…
In the West, freedom of expression is considered sacred. For a number of people, that freedom might even be regarded as absolute, thereby allowing an individual to insult even someone’s faith. Two issues must be clearly understood regarding this controversy. First, for Muslims, nothing and no one is above Islam. No one should be allowed to be disrespectful about anything remotely associated with Islam. Having an open discussion regarding the Islamic faith is perfectly acceptable. Insulting Islam is not. That old adage about disagreeing without being disagreeable (or offensive) is fully applicable here. Second, not many understand in the West that a requirement of the completion of the faith for Muslims is to love and respect the Prophet of their religion. That might also be an alien notion, especially among secular Westerners for whom freedom of expression has remained an integral part of their secular puritanism.

Freedom of speech is indeed a noble idea. To state that it should have no limits (or that it should be absolute) may be a useful academic exercise, but one should also keep in mind that such an exercise of freedom could also lead to the same kind of deleterious consequences as when one screams “fire” in a packed theater. Thus it is not enough to couch the whole argument about drawing caricatures of the Prophet under the rubric of freedom of speech, and thereby dismiss (or even be derisive about) the religious sensitivities of millions of Muslims. Why is it that the golden rule related to the insanity (or illegality) of yelling “fire” in a packed theater is not being applied here? That, in the final analysis, is the question the Western zealots of freedom of speech should answer. (Empahsis mine)

Read Ehsan Ahrari article over slowly. And then go over the quote from the Wretched again. It seems both cultures are at an impasse, but in the long run who will acquiescence?

The gulf and difference in values, assumptions and perception between millions of Muslims and what the West (esp. the sacredness of the freedom of speech) is not to be underestimated. This is a real division that exists between the cultures and a wedge that fundamentalist at both sides can drive and finally nail down to make the “Clash of Civlizations” a defacto truth.

——————
Update: The Brussel Journal points out that maybe the idea of freedom of speech being a sacred law in the West (at least in Europe) is not so true as it seems. Paul Belien, the author, has a point.

Update2: Tariq Ramadan discusses his own view of the matter here: Cartoon Controversy is not a Matter of Free Speech, but Civic Responsibility

Note: Posting has been and will be very light for a 1-2 weeks with work projects due and a vacation trip to Tahoe coming this weekend. As mentioned earlier, article contributions are welcomed.
——————-
Introduction
While oil, the Middle East and terrorism steal the headlines, we must not forget the need to seriously consider the security challenges from a range of issues from the changing climates to shifting demographics. This past week we have seen in the media concern on the cold spell in Europe (climate change?) and the rapid population decline in Scotland and Germany (demographic shift).

These topics are less sexy than terrorism and oil prices; and addressing its challenges will be far more difficult too. Changing climates and changing demographics will cause major shifts on a very wide horizontal level- it will effect every aspect of the state from domestic issues like pensions to the state’s relative global power.

Because these changes will cause ripples on a wide horizontal space of issues, these challenges can reset the global configuration of power more so than terrorism can; this fact must not be forgotten.
(more…)

Introduction

Tom Friedman’s recent NYT column, “Axis of Order?”, is a very interesting article not because of its main topic, dealing with Iran, but its recognition that we need to adjust to new realities of the new-core states. In essence, the need for bringing in the new-core states like China, Russia and India into the interntional process to be stakeholders:

Why has this now become a stakeholder test for China, Russia and India? Because if the Iranian mullahs who are now awash in petro- dollars know one thing, it is how to read power and weakness. The Iranians know that the United States has already put all the sanctions on Iran that it can. They seriously doubt that the Europeans will ever impose sanctions. And this is the key even if the Security Council censures Iran, and Europe miraculously joins the U.S. in imposing sanctions, the Iranians assume that China, Russia and India that’s half the world will never follow.

Only if China, Russia and India make it clear that they are not only willing to let Iran’s case be taken up by the Security Council, but that they will also join in stringent economic sanctions, will Iran back down. Western threats, which Iran’s radical president dismissed with the back of his hand Thursday as some little “fuss,” are no longer credible.

Communist Russia and China opposed the United States during the Cold War, and socialist India was neutral. But since the end of the Cold War, all three countries have embraced capitalism and become huge players and beneficiaries of today’s global economy, with Russia providing oil and gas, China manufacturing and India software. All three now have a huge stake in the stability of the international system.

But these countries have basically been cruising along as free riders on a stable international order, which has been maintained largely by the United States, with help from the European Union, NATO and Japan. Both Russia and China have actually used their clout at times to protect international bad actors like Iran, Sudan and North Korea out of a narrow economic self-interest and a kind of residual third-world, gotta-counter-the-Americans reflex.
…
That helped keep Iran on the fence for a while. But now Iran has gotten off the fence, and so must Russia, China and India. For their own sakes, if not America’s, these emerging big three have got to become the Axis of Order. The old cops on the beat can’t deal with the Axis of Evil alone anymore. Pay attention to how this one ends, folks. The structure of the whole post-Cold-War world is at stake.

Commentary

On the Evolving International System

Friedman is correct that the Iran Crisis will be an interesting test on how the new New Core members - India, China, and Russia - will react to a major crisis that is ocurring in: 1) near their neighborhood; and 2) a country with which they have substantial energy and financial connections with.

Calling the trio of New Core states to be an “Axis of Order” is cute, but doesnt address the bigger questions: How do these New Core states fit in to the international system? And, how do we ensure that these New Core states will adjust to the new international system in a way beneficial to the United States and the world?

For the United States, at the very least we need a Big Four Alliance system composing of the UK-US-Japan-India. Thomas Donnelly at AEI has written an excellent essay, Big Four Alliance on this. The only fault is that Donnelly’s focus is too narrow - focusing on anglosphere countries and it needs to be more ambitious. There should be a “Big Four Alliance” for sure, but this should be part of a larger framework of institutions that include the Big Four, as well as, Russia, China and Brazil.

On Iran and Nuclear Proliferation
The bigger question to ask in Iran is: Can we honestly say we can stop nuclear proliferation? And if not, what are our options?

In The Atlantic (Jan/Feb 06), William Langewiesche correctly argues in “The Point of No Return” that in this current world we cannot stop proliferation. Here’s a choice anonymous quote from the article:

You cannot have a world order in which you have five or eight nuclear-weapons states on the one hand, and the rest of the international community on the other. There are many places like Pakistan, poor countries that have legitimate security concerns—every bit as legitimate as yours. And yet you ask them to address those concerns without nuclear weapons—while you have nuclear weapons and you have everything else? It is not a question of what is fair, or right or wrong. It is simply not going to work.

Indeed, the world has changed and with it - to quote Thomas Barnett - we need new “rule-sets”.

Related:
If you would like a good roundup on events surrounding Iran, I suggest checking out this excellent posting by The Moderate Voice by Joe Gandelman.

Summary

Declining birthrates in places like Europe, Japan and Russia and increasing immigration in once homogenous states (like France) is becoming an issue of mainstream discussion. Just last week (January 04 & 05), the WSJ and the Economist both ran articles on the issue of demographics, commenting on the opposite ends but equally faulty premises. One seeing immigration and demographics change as signaling the decline of the West (WSJ) and the other tends to underplay the challenge of declining birthrate and changing demographics (Economist).

The impact of changing demographics are analyzed through the New Republic’s piece on the Netherlands, on the effects of Muslim immigration and the socio-political upheaval (a turn to the Right) it has caused in a state stereotyped as an uber-liberal country.

The challenge facing Netherlands (and other countries) is a major one: it is the challenge of successfully transitioning from a nation-state to a market-state. Indeed, Philip Bobbitt has already foresaw such issues in his seminal work The Shield of Achilles:

“Whereas the nation-state based its legitimacy on a promise to better the material well-being of the nation, the market-state promises to maximize the opportunity of each individual citizen…The current conflict is one of several possible wars of the market-states as they seek to open up societies to trade in commerce, ideas, and immigration which excite hostility in those groups that want to use law to enforce religious or ethnic orthodoxy.” (Emphasis mine)

(more…)

Introduction
I wrote a paper some years ago that I’d like to bring out to StrategyUnit, since I feel there is still a lot of room to discuss the (mislabeled) Global War on Terror (GWOT). Indeed, I believe that there is a supreme lacking in the mature development of a conceptual framework to understand the Global Islamist Insurgency (GII). Theoretical and conceptual frameworks are needed; it functions as a systematic “outline”, on which we can organize a strategy and devise proper policy. What follows before is shortened version of the original 20+ page paper.

The Premise
In the formulation of my own conceptual framework for understanding GWOT, I submit the following general premises:
1. The need to look beyond the traditional levels of analysis of international relations - personal, state and system level – and to take account local and transnational social cleavages.
2. Instability today is principally caused by the lack of “global connectivity” in certain counties and societies, resulting in local and regional crises and conflicts.
3. Variants of Salafi-Jihadi/Pan-Islamism have conflated these crises and conflicts as a global conflict against Islam and the Ummah by the “Other.”

Of course, there will alway be outlier cases, but the premises serves to cover the vast majority of situations relating to GWOT.

Thomas Barnett v. Samuel Huntington

There is no current theory or framework that can easily match with these premises. However, we can build this framework by synthesizing Barnett and Huntington. Below is a mini-review of their concepts and some of their shortfalls when taken alone.

Thomas Barnett declares that the amount of global “connectivity” in the world defines security issues in the international environment. It is the amount of connectivity a state possesses – in the transnational flow of trade, media, finances, information, culture et cetera – that distinguish between a peaceful, integrated “Core” state and a hostile or unstable “Gap” state. As Barnett states, the “new world must be defined by where globalization has truly taken root [the Core] and where it has not [the Gap].”(1) In short, the level of strategic regional and global security is directly linked to the level of globalization. This is no difference.

While Thomas Barnett presents a long term “big picture” framework for understanding the source of instability in the world, it cannot alone fully describe the nature of GWOT. It does not explain why certain peoples in certain regions are engaging in a confrontation against the members of the Core. In other words, if the international security environment is defined by those in the Gap and those in the Core, why were the majority of the 9/11 hijackers from Saudi Arabia, and not shamans from Indonesia or Orthodox Christians from Belarus?

The essential variables that need to be added to Barnett’s framework are those of religious and ultimately of socio-cultural factors.

While Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilization” goes to the extreme in treating cultural regions as nearly monolithic political blocks (that is, civilizations), Huntington does well in thrusting cultural, religious, social, and historical as variables in the calculus that influences the foreign policy orientations of states and non-state organizations. Indeed, Huntington must be acknowledged as prescient in declaring the revival of religions, particularly non-Western religions, as remerging as an important cultural and political force in the world.(2)

Huntington-Barnett with a Social Level of Analysis: Gap Societies?
I agree with Barnett on the instability of regions lacking “global connectivity” and Huntington’s emphasis on cultural and religions as important variables in international politics and his concept of “civilization faultlines.” Barnett’s builds a framework for understanding all global and local conflicts in the long term. Huntington emphasizes culture as the central factor.

Barnett and Huntington’s frameworks are not mutually exclusive and this paper builds on their scholarship and research to explain the nature of this war. Both Huntington and Barnett rely on system – Civilization vs. Civilization, Core vs. Gap – and state level of analysis, where does one place non-state groups like Al-Qaeda, Al Takfir Wal Hijra, Hizb ut-Tahrir and including their support structures and sympathizers? Additionally, how we explain the presence of such groups in the Core states of Western Europe or within the Western Civilization?

An elegant solution to this problem is applying social cleavages as another level of analysis complementing the state and system level of analysis. Organizations like Al-Qaeda to Hizb ut-Tahrir are not just “terrorist groups” or “Islamist extremist,” but groups that represent a worldwide social movement that transcend nation-states, Core or Gap states or civilization blocks. Thus, there is a need to focus on different social groups inside Core and Gap states that are disconnected from the larger society and how they related to other states and societies globally.

Towards a More Total Concept of Warfare
Beyond abandoning the Western concept of state-to-state warfare, this is conflict where the enemy employs a new “combined arms” strategy beyond the traditional means of Western warfare and follows John Robb’s “Global Guerilla” on the more tactical and operational level.

In traditional military usage, the term “combined arms” is defined by the U.S. Department of Defense as “The full integration and application of two or more arms or elements of one Military Service into an operation”(3) -such as the integrated and coordinated use of infantry, tank, precision bombers, and reconnaissance under one unified command. As war on the social level against the states and other societies, we see “combined arms” taking not only a purely military dimension but the integration of a full spectrum of human concerns – political issues, social issues, cultural issues, religious issues, etc – under the banner of a unifying ideology. In this case, this ideology is religious in nature.

GWOT as a Radical, Global and Muslim Social Movement
The use of social, cultural and religious issues as important dimensions of the war has it roots in the religious nature of this war – that is, religious as defined by the enemy. Stemming from its roots from Islam, Salafi-Jihadist share the tradition of embracing religion as a totality inseparable from any social sphere. In contrasts with the Peace of Westphalia that helped brought about the separation of the Christian church away from the state in the West, Islam has kept itself as the sole truth for all totality – it applies to and encompasses all aspects of human activity. In the West, the Muslim Brotherhood was most famous in emphasizing this fact of Islam, with its statement of recognizing “Islam as a total system” and the “final arbiter of life in all of its categories.” The most famous quote by the Muslim Brotherhood was its founder’s, Hassan al-Banna, proclamation that “Islam is a faith and a ritual, a nation and a nationality, a religion and a state, spirit and deed, holy text and sword.”(4) Indeed, other Muslim scholars, such as Sayyid Qutb, have criticized the West for its corruption of Christianity with its “schizophrenic” separation between the secular and the sacred, between church and state.(5) In contrasts to Christianity today, he declares Islam as a “system [that] extend into all aspects of life; it discusses all minor and major affairs of mankind.”(6)

Indeed, by actively uniting and linking all human activities to a single religious belief, it is easy to see how local conflicts affecting Muslims can be exploited to be seen as an attack on the entire global Muslim community – the Ummah. This combined with the concept of jihad al-asghar (lesser jihad) explains the confluence of local conflicts involving Muslims – Chechnya, Palestinian Issue, Moro in the Philippines – to being seen as a global conflict against Muslims.(7) And borrowing from John Robb, we see how quickly the conflict can become a social movement and a “Global Swarm”.

The relationship between social conflict and the fanatical organizations that exploit these conflicts are not only self-reinforcing, but help export and spread instability in the region and internationally (as illustrated above). In the primary link, each local conflict begins to be linked to a cause (Islamist jihad) and is transformed to being seen as one of many conflicts (reaching towards secondary linkage). This conflation of the socio-political and socio-economic issues with the Islamist movement reaches the point that, in some cases, it is difficult to distinguish between what are social problems and what is part of the war.

Conclusion
As this war is more of cross between an insurgency and a social movement, there maybe no clean cessation of violence in the near or distant future. And in this conflict, there will be no battlefield,s, but rather our adversaries will be attached as a Global Swarm as Global Guerillas.

If the U.S. and it allies achive victory (how can we even defien this?), there will be neither a ceremony on USS Missouri nor televised collapse of an “Evil Empire”. In the words of the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, “Some people see war and peace as a light switch. When the lights are off, it’s peacetime. When the lights go on, it’s wartime. I see more of a dimmer switch. We’ll see the intensity wax and wane, but there will always be some level of conflict going on.” (8) Let us hope that the United States and its allies dims that switch, least it will be a long hard slog.

—–
Sources
1. Barnett, Thomas P.M. “The Pentagon’s New Map.” Esquire. March 2003. (17 November 2003).
2. Samuel Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, (New York: Touchstone, 1997), 95-101.
3. United States of America. Defense Department. DOD Dictionary of Military and 3. Associated Terms, 30 November 2004, (04 September 2004).
4. Daniel Pipes, “Fundamentalist Muslims Between America and Russia”, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1986, Accessed Online: http://www.danielpipes.org/article/279 (04 February 2004).
5. Berman, Paul. Terror and Liberalism, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 89.
6. Sayyid Qutb, Social Justice in Islam, (New Jersey: Islamic Publications International, 2000), 32.
7. For a comparative to the Islamic concept of jihad al-asghar within the Abrahamic religions, see the Judaic concept of milchemet mitzvah (obligatory war) and the Christian concept of Just War as described in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica.
8. No Author. “Changing and Fighting, Simultaneously”, 30 October, 2004, National Journal, Available at (03 January 2005).

This week begins the first East Asia Summit (EAS) with over 16 countries invited, representing “3 billion people and one-fifth of global trade“. As the Washington Post writes:

As proposed by Malaysia and championed by China, the summit was conceived as a way for the 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to cooperate with China, Japan and South Korea — but not the United States — on security, social and economic problems. Many officials viewed it as a vehicle for Chinese leadership, making China the motor of an Asian bloc with a voice distinct from that of other Asia-Pacific groupings that include the United States.

Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea were some of the major nations invited to EAS. Russia was invited as well as an observer, making it all the more striking that the US wasnt.

Despite the growth in China’s clout in its region, the U.S. is still the de facto security guarantor of the region. While East Asia Summit, like ASEAN, will probably be mired by discord and inability to create concrete action, the fact that the U.S. is not part of the discussion in Kuala Lumpur is the ill-gotten fruit of our publicly voiced insecurity regarding China.

All this talk of China as the threat is driving China to play the game in Asia as zero-sum: its either the U.S. (pun intended) or China.

Given geography and culture, the East and South-East Asia is not the “natural” sphere of influence for the U.S. and we need to be reminded this. World War II gave our position in Asia, we should be careful not to squander it by driving China to carve its sphere and fight for influence at our expense.

Instead of containment in China, we should encourage tying China in to a mesh of pan-Asian institutions that will help China gain confidence in the region despite U.S. presence, while also constrain its range of maneuver.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Central Asia is a demonstration of China ability to create its own regional institutions as a tool to challenge the U.S. We need to build our own tool by putting China and the U.S. together in it.

Additionally, India is also looking to assert itself globally, we encourage and guide them on this process as partenrs, least they form their partnership with states that hold interests contrary to ours.

Former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore was quoted as saying : “We have little choice but to construct a new architecture for East Asia…If East Asia does not coalesce, it will lose out to the Americas and Europe…The key question is not whether East Asia will integrate. It is how quickly and the form East Asian regionalism will assume.”

Indeed, Gok Chok Tong is correct and it is even more the reason the U.S. needs to be able to partipate in these dicussion (EAS specifically and the future of Asia in general). We cannot ignore a region as sizeable and vibrant as Asia.

Someone needs to ask why what’s going on in the State Department and why isnt President Bush at the EAS?

As in update to my previous posting “Barnett’s Path to a U.S. Grand Strategy in Three Paragraphs“, Curzon at “Coming Anarchy” has an excellent post (”The New Allies”):

The United Kingdom is our main ally inside the EU. Althouh a part of the union, Britain does not use the Euro and emphasizes the “one market” aspect of the union, not a unanimous foreign policy. There is no better way to limit EU meddling than by allying with a powerful country inside the union that wish to limit the scope of its power.

Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic Three fear Russia and yet are wary of Franco-German dominance in the EU. The US has brought all these countries into NATO, Poland has the fourth largest number of troops in Iraq, and Bulgaria and Romania are in the final stages of negotiating the installation of US “lilypad” bases.

Ukraine and Georgia look to the EU and the United States as their possible protectors in the face of Russian aggression.

Strong relations with Vietnam, Mongolia, and Japan can be attributed to the fear of China flexing its muscle in the region.

All of these countries save Vietnam have troops in Iraq.

Though its a great overview, I think Curzon could have gone in greater depth in analysis. Most suprisingly for me is his omission of India from the map. Here’s my initial response to his posting, which attempts to inject further analysis on this topic:

The majors players working with the US are the major players of the Angolosphere (India, UK and Australia) and US former quasi-colonies in the East (Japan and possibly Philippines). Israel is also a strategic partner.

The other states are to all some degree buffer states with Poland the exception. In Europe, the Baltic states are too small to matter, while Romanian and Bulgaria don’t count so much other than possible military bases. With its internal political issues, Ukraine is a toss up at this point. Poland is still out to make a name for itself within a New Europe, but I dont know if it’ll ever have even comparable clout to Germany, France and the UK. Not until Poland can pull its GDP up.

The mentioning of Mongolia etc as part of the “Coalition of the Willing” is a joke. Only the UK, Poland, formerly the Ukraine and 1-2 other countries contributed substantial troops. Mongolia sent a token force of less than 300 troops. And the Ukrainian troops were famous for retreating under fire from the Insurgents.

Overall, the map looks pretty lonely. What about Turkey, South Korea, Latin America (lots of lng and oil) or Canada (possible large source of future oil)?

Heck, what about China as a limited partner? We have common interests in the security of the sealanes (where oil is transported); stability in the Korean Peinusula and also in the overall world; our mutual economic relationship direct and indirect; and stability in energy supplies.

Also, the question of where Russia fits into the “New World Order” is still in question. Russia has historically needed to expend its sphere of influence to feel secure. Indeed, the U.S. needs a stronger Russia to keep Central Asia and the Caucasus in line, while also holding a check against China.

Iraq maybe a future partner, but only fools would consider this so early in the game. Overall, we are pretty isolated in the Middle East, Israel excepted. With Iraq, Iran is a major puzzle to U.S. foreign policy there.

In the future, China may or may not be the next superpower, but no doubt it will be an even bigger player in the world. We need a major player in every region, especially those growing in power, e.g. China and Brazil. We can either ride the wave to the future or try to stubbornly stop it like fools.

Overall, the US is in a diplomatic low point, but it also presents the real partners we can depend on, mainly the UK and Austrialia. I would hope that soon we can add India (a new raising power) into this category.

Too many people are stuck in the old ways of thinking, be it ideaologues like neoconservatives to International ANSWER or jingoism of the Anti-China folks. Thomas Barnett is not one of them.

In his blog posting today, Thomas Barnett succinctly offers a very different perspective and game plan on what the U.S. must pursue to adjust to a true “New World Order” (in the words of Bush senior):

We should be promoting India as a regional security pillar in the Middle East, but we do not. We should be pushing hard for Russia’s fully admittance into NATO and some prioritized pathway into the EU, but we do not. We should be encouraging China’s use of the ASEAN group to create the genesis of an Asian Union, with us included in a special status, but we do not. Instead, we promote China’s encirclement through military alliances and then express surprise that China seeks to do the same to us.

The dynamics of the 21st century security environment will inevitably push the U.S. to greater reliance upon, and alliance with, Russia, India, China and Brazil. This is simply too big of a change for the current administration, just too far of a conceptual leap. So we end up waiting out the second Bush administration, hoping that we don’t fall too far behind, strategically speaking, in this process.

Meanwhile, Iran continues to look ripe for the connecting. When your best and brightest all seek to make a run for greener pastures, like Dubai just across the gulf, then it’s clear the current regime is failing. We can either prop it up by obsessing over the WMD issue, repeating the same myopic focus we had with Iraq, or we can judge the case on its merits and kill that tired authoritarian regime with economic and social connectivity.

Gone are the days when we think of state power in a state v. state way.

As mentioned earlier in StrategyUnit (”Events in Context: Paris Riots and SAFTA“), globalization has forced the national-state to evolve. While I think the overall Weberian notion of the nation-state still hold, nation-states must include greater connectivity (internall, externally and overall in the world) as part of its security considerations, and an increasing one at that.

Introduction

Koffi Annan’s push for UN reform has come and gone. Indeed, as the Washington Post reported last week, there are already moves to push for candidates as Annan retires on December 2005.

But it’s unlikely that Koffi Annan can make any reforms in his remaining tenure; and indeed, it must be said that it is also unlikely for any future Secretary General to enact any ambitious reforms. It’s a Herculean task that is highly improbable, unless the big 5 work in concert.

In today’s NYT, Ruth Wedgwood (from John Hopkins University) purposes to bring market forces to reform the UN:

Monopoly can be corrosive for any institution, and many of the problems addressed by the United Nations can be and have been handled in other forums. Washington and Turtle Bay would both be aided by recognizing the virtues of “competitive multilateralism.”

Wedgwood goes through the two main benefits of “competitive multilateralism”: 1) More policy options for the U.S. instead of a “Go with the UN or go it alone” strategy; and 2) that competition would reinvigorate the UN:

If the United Nations can’t reform on its own, America needs to support other multilateral venues. In fact, our seeking parallel paths to international intervention can help the United Nations as well.
…
The idea of competitive multilateralism avoids the stark choice of going alone or going to the United Nations. America must still support the purposes of the United Nations; it is a historic alliance, a product of World War II, and remains the only all-inclusive political organization around. America enjoys prerogatives as a permanent Security Council member that would be hard to gain again. But we do have some flexibility in how we choose to approach international cooperation.
..
In the Internet age, there is no single venue for cooperation. This is true for politics and business alike. The United Nations may gain a second wind and a youthful gait if it discovers that it has some real competition.

Commentary

While I find Wedgwood’s perspective very interesting, there several weaknesses I need to point out:

1) I am not sure how the UN responds to any sort of “market pressure” - the pressure that creates innovation in a marketplace. It is not a single organization with one voice per se, but rather represents (or the result of) 191 different nations vying for a voice and power in a large international organization.

In a normal market situation, if say the U.S. (the “customer”) stopped paying attention to the UN, the UN might make concessions to bring the U.S. back. But at this current trend of anti-Americanism around the globe, no one can honestly see China, France and Russia (UK maybe excepted) offering concessions for the U.S. to come back.

When Wedgwood speaks ‘The idea of competitive multilateralism avoids the stark choice of going alone or going to the United Nations”, I would assume that she alludes to the War in Iraq. But, what organization could the U.S. have reached out to? NATO? OSCE? League of Arab Nations?

Indeed, President Bush said that UN action on Iraq would define its legitimacy. But in the end, the U.S. went along with its “coalition of the willing” and it is the U.S. that today has no legitimacy.

2) Who wants a stronger UN? In any area, some nation would lost out. Stronger intervention powers for the UN would not be in US interests when Indonesia annexed East Timor. I doubt China would be too eager for the UN to intervene in Sudan, where it gets its oil. If more transparency is provided, that would limit the ability for nations to use cloak-and-dagger tricks to gain the upper hand in the UN.

In an effort to fit every nations’ interest, the UN is left to be the lowest common denominator - rarely doing anything bold that would upset any of the powers or a bloc of smaller ones.

3) States are already using organizations outside the UN. When the U.S. led an intervention force against Yugoslavia over Kosovo, it was done under the NATO - not UN. When China and Russia issued a statement asking the U.S. to leave Central Asia, they did it under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization - not the U.N.

Sometimes the U.S. has been somewhat successful such as with U.S.-led NATO action in Kosovo and other times lukewarm to disastrous like the “Coalition of the Willing”.

Ruth Wedgwood is right to say the U.N. should not have a monopoly in what defines the international community and the U.S. should nurture relationships with other international organizations for its own foreign policy goals. But, it wont be catalyst for U.N. reform.

Indeed, it can lead to the fragmentation of the international community space - with major power getting “legitimacy” for its policies from whatever regional or international organizations out there.

In the end, its not impossible to reform the U.N. - but U.S. using the dynamics of competition and market forces will not be the answer.

NAZI! Communists! Hippies!

Its easy to hate and focus on someone when you have a nice quick, short name for them. Lashing out against “Nationalist Socialist”, “Total Socialist System under Centralized Planning” and “Free Spirited non-Conformist” is not easy to do. (And yes, I know some of my descriptions are not absolutely accurate and I included hippies as a joke.)

But same goes for what we are fighting against in this “Global War on Terrorism”. Just who are the bad guys? And what makes them different from the other past bad guys?

I think there is a true strategic and psychological weakness on our side to accurately name our adversary. The guys on the other side can do it easily, condemning us as secular, western, infidels, non-believers and so on. But what are they? How can we fight an enemy when we cant even describe them.

Islamists? “Those that hate our freedom”? Salafist? Global Guerillas?

Islamist or Muslim Fundamentalist sound fine, but we are not fighting some national Muslim Brotherhood movement. We are fighting 1000s of Islamicly inspired groups with a diverse range of immediate goals, motivation, tactics, doctrines…but a common enemy - the West.

There is a constant struggle to define our enemy (which is more of a “swarm” than a singular organizational entity) and we are unable to even define a name for it. This leaves us intellectual and conceptual vulnerable to the enemy.

In my future postings, I’ll dive through this issue deeper and try to offer some suggestions. It will definitely take some time for me to write on this.

This posting was inspired by a commenter on this blog who asked me why I used the word “Islamofacist” and by Dan Darling and John Robb who touched on this issue this week.

The following is more of a commentary/opinion rather than StrategyUnit usual goal of analyses on issues and policies related to security issues.
————————————————————–
Update 10.03.05 - A Retraction and Correction:
1) After reading, researching and looking into the issue, I would like to retract my position of countering The Wretched at the Belmont Club
2) After reviewing the comment by Carsten Agger below, I have to put in question the reports of the riot in Denmark. Carsten has mentioned that this could really be a simple situation of alienated and jobless youth. Until, I can verify from additional sources - I’ll hold on the Denmark Riot issue. Thanks Carsten for your input.
3) Check out the follow-up posting “Paris Riots - Raise of the Europe’s Muslim Street, not Middle East’s Arab Street”
————————————————————–

A Restive Population in Europe
It is now day five of the riots in Clichy-sous-Bois, a suburb outside of Paris, which has now spread to other suburbs, Sevran, Neuilly-sur-Marne and Bondy [1]. The riots was sparked when allegedly two immigrant youths were electrocuted after coming into contact with a transformer while under fleeing from the police. During the riot on Sunday, a tear-gas that launched at a mosque serving only to exacerbate the riots.

At the same time, sectarian riots have sparked in Denmark:

“Rosenhøj Mall has several nights in a row been the scene of the worst riots in Århus for years. “This area belongs to us”, the youths proclaim. Sunday evening saw a new arson attack.
…
We are tired of what we see happening with our prophet. We are tired of Jyllands-Posten. I know it isnt you, but we wont accept what Jyllands-Posten has done to the prophet”, he says aggressively, and the others nod approvingly. [2]”

The last bit is a reference to the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, which recently has been sent death threats over a drawing of the Prophet Muhammad by a cartoonist.

While those that support Huntington’s “Clash of Civilization” would not be surprised, those on the other wide would disagree. They would point to social issues being the root cause: from the plight of the immigrant community in the slum housing in French suburbs to the general alienation and seemingly self-segregation of Muslim immigrant community throughout Europe. What I’ve learned from my own study of this- both views cannot be discounted nor are they mutually exclusive.

From Discontent to Jihad
Taking from the “Other Side” Robert Leiken (Foreign Affairs Aug 05) recently wrote: As the French academic Gilles Kepel acknowledges, “neither the blood spilled by Muslims from North Africa fighting in French uniforms during both world wars nor the sweat of migrant laborers, living under deplorable living conditions, who rebuilt France (and Europe) for a pittance after 1945, has made their children … full fellow citizens.” [3]

With no support network and a sense of alienation among the youth, radical Islamic foundations would only welcome them with open arms. It is no surprise that France has been repeatedly targeted for bombings, including more recently a plot to shoot down aircrafts in France.

Alienation of Muslim immigrants goes on to link up with the Global Islamofacist Movement and Insurgency, a self reinforcing network linking all oppression of Muslims (real and imagined) as part of a global struggle:

(More on the explanation behind this graph in part 2)

Robert Leiken goes on to divide the jihadist into two types of immigrant: outsiders and insiders. Outsiders were the newly arrived immigrants who served as the grunts and cannon-fodder (sometimes literally) of the jihadist organization; some of them may be radical imams seeking asylum but with funding from Saudi Arabia and seeking to start a jihadist network. The insiders are second generation immigrants, who are westernized in education yet anti-western and generally the leaders (think Zacarias Moussaoui).

Yet unfortunately the story doesn’t stop there…
(more…)