Quick Post: Nukes, New-Core, and New Realities

January 16, 2006

Introduction

Tom Friedman’s recent NYT column, “Axis of Order?”, is a very interesting article not because of its main topic, dealing with Iran, but its recognition that we need to adjust to new realities of the new-core states. In essence, the need for bringing in the new-core states like China, Russia and India into the interntional process to be stakeholders:

Why has this now become a stakeholder test for China, Russia and India? Because if the Iranian mullahs who are now awash in petro- dollars know one thing, it is how to read power and weakness. The Iranians know that the United States has already put all the sanctions on Iran that it can. They seriously doubt that the Europeans will ever impose sanctions. And this is the key even if the Security Council censures Iran, and Europe miraculously joins the U.S. in imposing sanctions, the Iranians assume that China, Russia and India that’s half the world will never follow.

Only if China, Russia and India make it clear that they are not only willing to let Iran’s case be taken up by the Security Council, but that they will also join in stringent economic sanctions, will Iran back down. Western threats, which Iran’s radical president dismissed with the back of his hand Thursday as some little “fuss,” are no longer credible.

Communist Russia and China opposed the United States during the Cold War, and socialist India was neutral. But since the end of the Cold War, all three countries have embraced capitalism and become huge players and beneficiaries of today’s global economy, with Russia providing oil and gas, China manufacturing and India software. All three now have a huge stake in the stability of the international system.

But these countries have basically been cruising along as free riders on a stable international order, which has been maintained largely by the United States, with help from the European Union, NATO and Japan. Both Russia and China have actually used their clout at times to protect international bad actors like Iran, Sudan and North Korea out of a narrow economic self-interest and a kind of residual third-world, gotta-counter-the-Americans reflex.

That helped keep Iran on the fence for a while. But now Iran has gotten off the fence, and so must Russia, China and India. For their own sakes, if not America’s, these emerging big three have got to become the Axis of Order. The old cops on the beat can’t deal with the Axis of Evil alone anymore. Pay attention to how this one ends, folks. The structure of the whole post-Cold-War world is at stake.

Commentary

On the Evolving International System

Friedman is correct that the Iran Crisis will be an interesting test on how the new New Core members - India, China, and Russia - will react to a major crisis that is ocurring in: 1) near their neighborhood; and 2) a country with which they have substantial energy and financial connections with.

Calling the trio of New Core states to be an “Axis of Order” is cute, but doesnt address the bigger questions: How do these New Core states fit in to the international system? And, how do we ensure that these New Core states will adjust to the new international system in a way beneficial to the United States and the world?

For the United States, at the very least we need a Big Four Alliance system composing of the UK-US-Japan-India. Thomas Donnelly at AEI has written an excellent essay, Big Four Alliance on this. The only fault is that Donnelly’s focus is too narrow - focusing on anglosphere countries and it needs to be more ambitious. There should be a “Big Four Alliance” for sure, but this should be part of a larger framework of institutions that include the Big Four, as well as, Russia, China and Brazil.

On Iran and Nuclear Proliferation
The bigger question to ask in Iran is: Can we honestly say we can stop nuclear proliferation? And if not, what are our options?

In The Atlantic (Jan/Feb 06), William Langewiesche correctly argues in “The Point of No Return” that in this current world we cannot stop proliferation. Here’s a choice anonymous quote from the article:

You cannot have a world order in which you have five or eight nuclear-weapons states on the one hand, and the rest of the international community on the other. There are many places like Pakistan, poor countries that have legitimate security concerns—every bit as legitimate as yours. And yet you ask them to address those concerns without nuclear weapons—while you have nuclear weapons and you have everything else? It is not a question of what is fair, or right or wrong. It is simply not going to work.

Indeed, the world has changed and with it - to quote Thomas Barnett - we need new “rule-sets”.

Related:
If you would like a good roundup on events surrounding Iran, I suggest checking out this excellent posting by The Moderate Voice by Joe Gandelman.

2 Comments »

The URI to TrackBack this entry is: http://strategyunit.blogsome.com/2006/01/16/quick-post-nukes-new-core-and-new-realities/trackback/

  1. Many people think that the old industrial countries will need to adjust to new realities. “The old cops on the beat can’t deal with the Axis of Evil alone anymore. . . [T]he world has changed and with it - to quote Thomas Barnett - we need new “rule-sets”.”

    But does the political will exist, nationally, to comply with international rule sets? Some rule sets already exist - in the West alone, for example, the United States is averse to global financial discipline (from ‘Three Billion New Capitalists’: “America needs to recognise that many of the assumptions guiding its economic policy are at odds with the realities of today’s global economy.); and members of the EU multinational experiment don’t help much by paying scant attention to the ‘Stability & Growth’ Pact.

    Moreover the US is telling the EU to ban arms sales to mainland China, and last week tried to stop Spain selling arms to democratic Venezuela. So the experience with rules in a small part of the world is not encouraging.

    Kaplan and Ferguson 1, Barnett and Prestowitz 0.

    Comment by IJ — January 17, 2006 @ 3:00 pm

  2. IJ,

    No, I dont think the US or most of the West have the political will. Politicians are seemingly by nature mostly short-sterm thinkers, rather than long-term strategic thinkers. (Not that strategic view chosen is always right.)

    As for “Barnett v. Kaplan”, I think there far more to it: Kaplan preaches about what the world will become, while Barnett preaches about what the world can be (but he tries to do so in the realm of pragmatism).

    I hold both Barnett and Kaplan in high esteem and I think they are both right. Left at the current course, Kaplan’s vision is very much possible or we can roll-up our sleeves and take a gamble with Barnett.

    Comment by StrategyUnit — January 18, 2006 @ 8:02 am

RSS feed for comments on this post.

Leave a comment

Line and paragraph breaks automatic, e-mail address never displayed, HTML allowed: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <code> <em> <i> <strike> <strong>


Get free blog up and running in minutes with Blogsome | Theme designs available here