Russia-Ukraine Gas Update: Role of Dmitry Medvedev
Complimentaring StrategyUnit’s post on the Russia-Ukraine Gas sega, StratFor’s Peter Zeihan has an interesting perspective on the possible role and orientation of Dimitri Mendevev, Putin’s newly selected Prime Minister, and his in the Ukraine-Russian Gas issue.
StratFor’s article is interesting because it takes account to the role of Mendevev, whereas Jamestown Foundation, Eurasianet et al have been more focused on Putin or Russia itself.
So, who is this Medvedev?
In mid-November, Russian President Vladimir Putin named Dmitry Medvedev as first deputy prime minister. Medvedev is a rather rare personality in Russian politics, in that he is a modernizer who has not become unrealistically optimistic about Russia ever looking like — much less joining — the West, and a nationalist who has not fallen prey to the debilitating paranoia that often characterizes Russian policy. He also happens to be Putin’s protégé and the board chairman of Gazprom. The Ukraine natural gas crisis was his first Russian foreign-policy initiative.
Medvedev, like all Russians, recognizes that his country’s long-term prospects without Ukraine are, at best, bleak. That means that Russia’s European relations have become of secondary importance — they are no longer an end in their own right, but rather a means to other ends.
According to Stratfor, Medvedev’s motivations are similar to what was mentioned in StrategyUnit’s article: a method to reassert Russia on the world stage, taking advantage of the G-8 chairmanship to set the tone of its chairmanship. In this case it is to force Europe to consider Russia’s interests, power and importance seriously.
Prior to the Jan. 1 shutoff, the Europeans had become complacent, unappreciative of the scope of their dependency upon Russia or how much they have taken a “friendly” Moscow for granted since the end — or even before the end — of the Cold War. Energy supplies to Europe continued throughout the Afghan war, the 1983 war scare, the Moscow Olympic boycott, the putsch against Gorbachev, the Soviet breakup, the Chechen war, the Kosovo war, and the enlargements of NATO and the EU. The Europeans grew confident that as far as energy supplies were concerned, the Russians — while unpredictable in their rhetoric — were rock-solid in their reliability.
Medvedev’s primary goal was to redefine European perceptions of Russia. As of Dec. 31, Western Europeans perceived Russia primarily as an easily dismissed, benign former foe. But with the Gazprom cutoff — which diminished gas supplies needed for heating in the middle of winter — Russia proved itself not only sufficiently erratic to be taken seriously, but also capable of inflicting very real pain with a modicum of effort.
Now, did the Russians want to hurt the Europeans? Of course not. Europe, particularly “old” Europe, remains a potential partner for Moscow, and there is no reason for the Kremlin to introduce spite into an already complex relationship. But did the Russians want the Europeans to know that the Kremlin has the capacity and chutzpah to turn the screws? Absolutely. And doing so at a time of year when the wind whipping off the North Sea is anything but balmy adds that ever-incisive Russian touch.
This is not about establishing trust, but about establishing in Europe a respect for Russia’s strengths and an awareness of Russia’s concerns.
…
The elegance of Medvedev’s strategy lies in the fact that simply causing the Europeans to think about Russian interests means that the Kremlin has driven a wedge not only between the Europeans and the Ukrainians, but between the Europeans and the Americans. If Russia is to recover what it has lost in geopolitical stature these past 15 years, this is precisely the sort of policy that will give it a fighting chance.
The entire article has more details regarding Ukraine’s motivations and calculations as well as its historic importance to Russia. Most interestingly it points to Yushchenko potential use of the gas issue as a way to play the “anti-Russian” card to boost his popularity for the upcoming March parliamentary elections.
If someone would like to see the article, please let me know and I can forward it. I am unsure if its available freely online.
anti-russian card
remind me of Chen Shuibian in Taiwan.
anyway, i do not think yushenko would ask for such dispute. he would be more than happy to settle this, if it is at a price favorably to ukraine.
Comment by sun bin — January 6, 2006 @ 6:47 am
it requires premium subscription. but if you search via google news, you can use google’s subscription to access the content
Comment by sun bin — January 6, 2006 @ 7:07 am
The kind offer of a copy of the article was trumped by the information from sun bin.
On energy transit internationally, we are again seeing the importance of the EU building an energy policy. This should be done ASAP. Perhaps the policy should be even wider than the EU?
Anyway, in the absence of such a policy, Stratfor alludes to the growing conflict within the EU:
“With the one internationally approved vehicle for German ambition — the European Union — in rather less than the best shape, Berlin’s options for furthering its interests are nil. Without energy to power its economy, Germany will remain the underwhelming geopolitical power it has been since the end of World War II. [Russian PM] Medvedev’s maneuvering will force Germany to take the greatest interest of all the European powers in keeping the Russians happy. . .”
Comment by IJ — January 6, 2006 @ 8:52 am
Come on, do you honestly think that Russia turned off the gas in order to spite or to hurt the EU? Ukranians have always been the same, they want to have a bit of this and a bit of that, they want to be both in the EU, in the West and receive almost free subsidized oil and gas from Russia. There is a funny saying in Russian, “where there was a Ukranian, there is no point for a Jew to be there”. This essentially means that Ukrainians want everything and expect to get everything from everyone for free and not give anything in return. Russian plans were not to freeze the EU and western Europe into submission but to show Ukrainians that the time of subsidized and cheap gas is over if you no longer wish to be with Russia as partners.
Comment by Kolya, Moscow — February 10, 2008 @ 2:25 am