Van Creveld on the Iraq War: The Other Side of Connectivity
Intoduction
(Via John Robb) Martin Van Creveld, military strategist who foresaw the raise of non-western warfare (e.g. War on Terrorism) to the shrinking of the tradition role of states, has written in Forward Newspaper (Major Jewish-American publication) an gives his pessimistic analysis on the War on Iraq:
[A] divided, chaotic, government-less Iraq is very likely to become a hornets’ nest. From it, a hundred mini-Zarqawis will spread all over the Middle East, conducting acts of sabotage and seeking to overthrow governments in Allah’s name.
While coming from one of the brightest minds in military thinking, Van Creveld’s opinion is neither unique nor shocking. But what struck me was how John Robb headlined that particular excerpt above: “Iraq in turn destabilizes the region as global guerrillas spread out.”
In the words of Thomas Barnett: Its about Connectivity, Stupid!
As mentioned in a paper I wrote, the principal argument I had made on supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom was that “U.S. intervention aiding in the creation of a liberal democratic Iraq is key in bringing not only liberalism to the region, but in essence exporting a new regime of strategic security to the Middle East.” In short, a liberal Iraq would reach out and bring economic connectivity to the stagnate Middle East region and with it a new security regime.
On the opposite end…One of the more saner arguments against the war, as Van Crevald said, was that the intervention would ultimately fail, launching hundreds of mini-Zarqawis and min-Bin Ladens all over the Middle East.
But in essence, these two arguments are the one and the same and I agree with both:
1. A free, liberal and democratic Iraq can act as a hub to further economic (and maybe even political) connectivity in the region stimulating economic growth and with it regional stability.
2. A divided, failed Iraqi state can act as a hub (a “bazaar of violence” in John Robb’s term) that will reach out to export instability to neighbouring countries while also attracting many to join Al-Qaida-related groups in Iraq.
Its about all connectivity, but different sides of the same coin. Thus, as made time and time again by many - the question is not if we will withdraw from Iraq, but as the Economist puts it “Not whether, but how, to withdraw“.
The War in Iraq is about connectivity. Originally, it was under the idealistic impression that the only connectivity possible was the championing of liberalism in the Middle East, but in the current sobering reality - we know that connectivity cuts both ways.
What connectivity will the New Iraq ultimately bring to the Middle East?
One thing for sure is, if we withdraw unilaterally now, we’ll surrender the chance for liberal connectivity.






From the day of his inauguration, I strongly supported
President Bush’s leapfrog of West Europe to rebuild
NATO around East Europe and then link it to the
preexisting Western NATO. I also strongly supported
his surround China strategy as you bring it into the
world market. My first questioning of Bush
Administration policies came after 9/11 when, to my
despair, it decided to kill the alQaeda snake by
stomping on its middle, allowing the head to bite us
again. It was not able to bite us again because its
leaders would not allow its operatives to do anything
less than had its 9/11 shahids– something they were
not able to do. So alQaeda did strike instead our
European allies several times.
Late in 2001 I thought that with numerous powers out
to outmaneuver America– particularly China– we
should have kept in mind what constitutes deterrence,
a concept that kept us safe through the first half of
the nuclear age. What that is can be appreciated by
looking at Medieval Japan. Then, the samurai kept
others in line, not with the sword, but through the
aura of their standing. This was derived from a
triplet of dignity, authority and power. Should a
samurai have cause to draw his sword on a commoner, he
would have to commit Hari-kari because he had
disgraced himself by losing his dignity and authority,
having to resort to his power.
At the end of the Cold War America was exhausted. This
exhaustion began with the end of the Vietnam War.
America no longer wanted to invest in its power. But
it also no longer wanted to invest in its intelligence
services. Seeing the CIA as an operational agency
rather than an eye on the rest of the world, many
sought to disband it after the demise of the USSR. It
was not realized that, despite the CIA myth
popularized by mass media culture, America’s dignity
and authority were augmented by its ability to know
and understand what’s going in all over the world,
despite bungled CIA operations (ops) in a number of
places. Our Vietnam failure was blamed on poor CIA
intelligence (Intel) rather than Presidential
strategy. Assuming the CIA ops to be the beginning of
American entanglements in wars abroad, many urged
disbanding the Agency.
While America saw little to be gained from Intel,
alQaeda did not. When its operatives saw that, despite
our resolution to make the pilot’s cabin impenetrable
because of many skyjackings in the 1970s, we didn’t
they planned and executed 9/11. When the Jihadists
forced us out of our isolationism, we focused on our
military, sending troops on special ops Intel blind
To my dismay, I saw President Bush responding to 9/11
“from the gut,” instead of recognizing that it could
only happen because of our irresponsible unwillingness
to accept the cost of protecting our airliners.
Instead of then focusing on our Intel services to
better understand the enemy, he responded with hubris
and bravado, making a childish Cowboys-and-Indians
game out of getting binLaden “dead or alive.” We thus
sent in our forces Intel blind. Thus exhibiting our
power, we sacrifices our dignity and authority, losing
our allies and needlessly bogging ourselves down in
the one secular Middle Eastern nation that in no way
participated in the Jihad, Iraq. Seeking to become
known as the “war president” with an eye to
re-election, Mr. Bush exposed the upper limit of our
military capacity for all others to see. This samurai
not only depleted his dignity and authority in his
show of force but also exposed the upper limits of
that force. I consider it nothing short of criminal
negligence to allow our weakness, both in Intel and
ops, to be so exposed sending in our troops Intel
blind.
I had hoped that the Bush doctrine would have
established that there is no such thing as a stateless
Jihadist war of terror. The Jihadists would not have
been able to carry out their operations without the
active or passive support of a number of states. It
was incumbent on Mr. Bush to recognize that 9/11 was
our own fault, but then to declare that, should the US
again come under assault, our forces would totally
retaliate against those states that made it possible.
Now binLaden is still at large sending threatening
audiotapes and now we fear an alQaeda nuclear strike.
Thus began my opposition to Mr. Bush’s re-election;
and, it intensified when he failed to exhibit the
Kennedyesque vision and courage to declare that
America would marshal all its technical expertise to
make itself independent on Middle East oil within a
decade.
Now, Mr. Bush sits helpless watching Iran develop
nuclear armaments. Because of our obvious exhaustion
in Iraq he cannot mount a credible threat that would
stop Iran. It has seen the upper limit of our “new”
military. Consequently, we are now where we started.
All President Bush can do is accept Iran’s
nuclearization and warn that, should America undergo
nuclear attack, we know where it would come from and
we will respond with all our thermonuclear capacity.
Mr. Bush has bungled his way full circle. I can only
hope that this time he gets it right as we pull out of
Iraq and return to reliance on our deterrent capacity.
The lesson may be that, in showing the courage to
accept Iran’s nuclearization as defensive, he regains
the dignity and authority America lost to date. The
implicit power with which he gets the Iranians to go
after alQaeda would quickly be self-evident. In the
meantime, the American people must realize that good
intelligence is a game of patience, not action. Every
Predator missile at best destroys the pathology we
seek to understand, making impossible for us to know
the next threat on the horizon.
The Bush Administration should also return its focus
on Eastern Europe, as Secretary of State Rice would
have it do. It belies America’s weakened position to
allow Putin and the Russian remnant of the USSR to
tweak America’s nose intimidating our East European
NATO allies and its South Asian neighbors.
Daniel E. Teodoru
Comment by DE Teodoru — April 20, 2006 @ 10:53 pm